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ABSTRACT 
The pur po$e of this thesis is to i nvesti gat e the 
de gree of infl uence whi ch Amerioa.n business i nte re sts in 
Chi na ex erted u.pon United States policy tm:1ard Japan durin g 
th e period 1937-1938. On the ni ght of July 7, 19;7, 
Japanese mi lit ary f0rees invaded the Republi c of China 
without a prior declaration of war, Durin g the :months of 
unde cla red but unrestrain ed war- which followed, foreign 
investments in the trade and industry of China wer e 
threatened with extine .tion. As hos tilities beca me more 
widespread, busines s acti-vity within China was brou ght to a 
virtual standstill; and propertie1B owned by for ei gn 
commercial gr oups fre quently suff ered extensive damage . 
The Japanese Government, moreover, made deliberate efforts 
to forc .e the withdrawa l of all f orei gn ind ust ry and trade 
fro m those areas of China under its control. 
American busine ss interests in Chi l'la conde mned 
Ja pan 's war of aggression and ca lled upo1ll. the Unit;ed States 
Government to defend the commerci al ri ghts whic h were guar-
anteed by the Open noor po1iey, Throughout 1937 and 19.38, 
the commercial gr oup s in Chi na i nsisted th at the go.ver mnent 
i n Was hing ton adopt more s pi rited mea sures against t he 
Japanese . The busine ss c·ommunity wa..s well or gan ized an d 
suoceeded in kee pin g its observations and opin i ons 
regarding developments in China before the American 
Government and the American people. This study will inves-
tigate the role which American business interests sought to 
play in the formulation of U~ited States policy toward 
Japan. 
A most va luable source of primary materials was 
provided by Volu me I of t he Foreign Relations of the United 
States: Japan, 1931-1941, a compi l ation of diplomatic 
papers published by the Depar tment of State in 1943. 1'he 
China Weekly Review, an English language newspaper pub-
lished in Shanghai, reflected the attitude of American cit-
izens resident i n China during 1937 and 193$. The Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle, a leading commercial journal, in-
dicated the opi nion of businessmen in the United States 
toward the war in East Asia. The Congressional Record 
revealed what was being thought on Capitol Hill in the 
period 1937-193$. Henrv L. Stimson's On Active . Service in ., 
Peace and War, ,Jose ph C. Grew's Ten Years in Japan, and The 
Memoirs of Cordell Hull, provided valuable insights into 
United States foreign policy. 
Sev era l secondary sources wer e of special value in 
this study. John w. Masland's "Commercial Influence Upon 
Far Eastern Policy, n published in the Pacific Hi st orical 
Review, must be rated as of pr i mary import ance. An 
excellent survey of the nature and value of American com-
~erce in China was presented in Miriam S. Farley's 
"America's Stake in the Far East," which appea red in Far 
Easter~ Survey in 1936. Other noteworthy secondary sources 
were A. Whitney Griswold's The Far Ea.stern Pol;icy of the 
Unit~d .States, William c·. Johns tone' s The United States and 
Ja pan 1·s New Ord er, and Rober t E . Osgoodts Ideals and . Sel£-
In tere st in AmericQ.'s Forei gn Rela t iop.s. 
The major finding of this study is that American 
commerci a l int~re~~s ill China di.d exert an ulti mat e in .. 
fluence upon United States poli cy toward Ja pan. 'rhis in .. 
fluence, hcH,;ever, ,,ras· indirect and oversha dowed by the 
broader cone~rns of American national self ... interest. 
Alt~ough the AmericE;n Go.vernment came to the defense of the 
Open Door in China during 1?37 and 1938', it, was not mo-
tivated by any intrinsic desire to preserve Sino - American 
economi c relations. The United Sta te s Government and pub lic 
opinion in genera l had never considered the China trade to 
be G>f vital nationa l i mport ance. But in 1937 American 
states men were vit lly interested in obst;ructing Japan's 
ef forts to cre ·ate a unew order!' in East Asia. It ·was to 
thwart Japan th at the United States upheld the Open Door, 
and not beeause of any inherent desire to sust ain American 
commerci al interests in China .. 
Al t hough the business community was unsucce .ssful in 
its att em ts to influence American policy dire ctly, the re 
is a sense in which the commercial interests in China did 
affect the sub s equent course of Ja uane se ... Ameri can relations. 
The repeated destruet;i.on of American lives and pr operties 
by the Ja panese gradually an gered the peopl e of the United 
States . As publi c resentment grew . the Americ·an Government 
was given incre as ed latitude in its efforts to deter 
Japanese imperialism in East Asia. It is in this way that 
the violation of American commercial rights in China was to 
have an ultimate influence upon Unit ed States policy in 
East A.sia. 
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~HAP'l'ER I 
I NTRODUCTION Arm HIS 'l'O ~ICAL BAC: GROUND 
Early Diplomatic and Commercial Relations , 1784-1900 
Since the earliest days of the America n Republic , 
American merchants have carried on commercial relations 
with China. The voya ge of the Empres 8 of China in 1784 
marked the first ti Jne an American shi p had sailed directl y 
to Canton, the center of the early China tra de.I Wit hin 
thirty years, Canton was t he site of a. gro wing community of 
resident American commercial agents.2 
Like t he •uro pean traders who proceeded the m, 
American merchants sought the exotic produc t s of the ancient 
Celestial Kin gdom. The ea rly China cli ppers brou ht back 
silks, spic es, and tea, which were paid f or lar e;el y in 
:specie. This early trade, t hough small i n volume, was of 
considerable import ance to a youthrul an small maritime 
nati on whi ch i n its ear ly year s depended he.avily upon for-
ei gn tr ade and shi ppin g for it s liveli hood.3 Althou gh many 
1 aul H. Clyde, The Far East: A Histo:r v of the 
I mpact of t he West on Ea ste r n Asia ( New York: . Fre ntice-
Hail, Inc., 1948), P• 127. 
2Julien Arnold, China: A Commercial and Industrial 
Handbook, U. s. Dept. of Commer ce Tr ade Promotion Series 
No·. 28 (viashin gt on= U. S. Government ri ntin g Office, 
1926), P • 139. 
3Miriam S. Far ley, 0 America's St ake in the Ii'a.r 
i'ast, I: Tra de, rt Far East ern ~urveY:, V ( July 29, 1936}, 162 . 
2 
A er fcans interested in th e Far Eas t ern trade consi dered 
China. t o be t he . iOSt valuable Asian .Jta:rk et , t he ir consi d-
erat i on s were based ma i n yon the hop e qf futur e deve l-
opments rather t han upon pr esen t a ccom li shment s.4 This 
emphas is u· on the potential trade with China ra ther t han its 
a ct ualities was to be a consta ntly recurrin g the me in 
Chinese-A mer ican relation s. 
The first American mercha nt s con ucted t h ei r tr.J.de 
wi t h a l ar ger measur e of individual fr ee om than did the 
Briti sh , th ~ir chief rivals. Ameri ca n..,t bowev r, did not 
en joy t he fi ian cial ba cking or the presti 6 e of the English 
East India Company , nor did they ha ve then val pr otec ti on 
of t heir government . s lon g as the earl y Arrerican tra er 
fe lt t 1at he enjoy ed equal tradin g ter ms 'V ith the British, 
there was little agit atio n f or the off icial su pport of th e 
author i ties in \'.a.shing ton. But as re l a.tions grew more 
st rained be t ·1een the British and the Chinese Government 
af ter 1834, thi s ear ly i nd i f f eren c~ t o offi cial support 
gave way .5 
~ en t he Chinese gave indication in 1839 _tha t t hey 
would work to li mit th e vol ume of forei gn trade at Cant on, 
then t he only Chi nese port open to forei gn co.mnerce, the 
America n businessmen of t hat cit y petitioned the Unit ed 
4·11lliam L. 1 umann, " Ambi guity and Ambivalence i n 
Idea ls o:f · ation al Int er est i n Asia," Isolation- and 
Se cur iU, ed . Alexander DeConde (Dur ham, 1fort h Carolina: 
5uk e Univer sit y Press , 1957), p . 151. 
5c1yde, p . 127. 
States Congress to send a commerci a l agent who ~-.ras 
autho_ized to conclude a tre aty of commerce. Furthermore, 
they re'"'uested, a naval force ad e uate to ~-rote ct Ameri can 
citi .ze ns and pro perty, · It ·was du.ring t hi s pe riod of wors-
enin g An· lo .. Chin ese relat'.ions t hat the att,ention o:f.' the 
American Government and American citi zen s was turned unon 
the .em.bryonic commerce at "ar ,.;'Way Ganton. 6 
Before th e American Govern ment i"elt constrained to 
act, however, the f irst of a series of wars which ,;ere to 
prove fatal to China's sove rei nty t ook place. The 
occ asi on for t he first a:rmed clash bet"7een China and a 
western po,er was the illegal traf f ic in opium whi ch :reat 
Britain had 'been enga ging in.. 'I'he unprecedented "'-rowth of 
this tra. e in the years i mraediately prior to hostilities 
produced serious consec-1uences for China.. To r a.y f or t h is 
Vcstly increased i mportation in opium the Chinese Gov ... 
erl"u"nent had been forced to export silver 1 much to the 
nation's eco nomic detri ment. The efforts of China to -cur-
tail this tra~e pr ovi ed the cause f or war.7 
r.rhe so-called Opium War ( 1839.-1 LJ.2) b - t we ,.n Ore" t 
Britain and the Chi nese :Gmpire ended disrstrously for the 
already enervate Celestial Kin gd om of the f,ianchus • Help .. 
less before the super ior stren gth of a tfba:r ,a roustt na~ion, 
Chi na was forced to sue r or peace wi th Great Britai n . The 
da ys o:f Chi na 's exclus i veness and su periority were · at an 
end. The next hundred. years wo 1·1 d see in c.r.aas i n.gl y 
3 
4 
vora ·cious :foreign intruders di ct ate th e terms under which 
China mi ght enjoy tr r de and peace-. 8 
The Treaty of fank i g (1842} whi ch officially ended 
t he Opium :Jar, an a sup plementary treaty s igned a year 
1'1ter, set th~ basic pr i nci ples whiehwer e nto govern 
China's international status ""or a ce ntury . n9 China was 
forced to open ne I ports t o forei gn comrnerce, agreed to a 
uniforn -~nd mod0rate tariff, provt ded fo r extraterritorial 
juris di ction in cri minal cases--a seri01.1s infrin gement upon 
China's soverei gnty- ... and se cured the most ... favored-nation 
treatment f or Brita in. This latt er provision gua ranteed 
that if t he Chinese Emperor subsequently granted additional 
pr ivile ge s or immunities to ot h er f orej_g11 countries, the 
same :i.mmu.ni ties and pri vile es would be extendec to c;i.nd 
enjoyed by British subjects.lo 
When the American Government learned _ that Great 
Bri t ain had wrung th e most -f av orec-uation agreement from 
the overi-t elmecl IV'anchus, the United St ate s fel t that the 
time ha come to ive serious attention to the future of 
Ameri can trade. and commerce in Chi na .• ll It was to safe ... 
g ard the futu re of th1.s trade and commerce tha t Pre sident 
J'ohn Tyler authorized the i nt r ep i d d:lpl ()mat Caleb Cushing 
to seek t he most-fav ored ... n.s.tion tre atment for Ameri can 
8Jbid., p. 124. 9Ibid., P • 125. 
11Ibid., P• 129. 
busi ness men .12 
Cushi n was eminent l y success f ul i 1 carr yin g out 
the instructio ns of his sup erior. I n 1844, the United 
States conclu ded its firs t t rea t y with !e kin g . Both 
Congress and th e Amerj.ca.n public P.:ave h earty approval to 
5 
the commerci ~l tre aty which Cushi ng ha d concluded, f or as 
one Congres sman obser ved, no one knew " ' just how much of our 
t obacc o mi ght be chewed foy the Chines~l in place of 
o ium. t nlJ 'fhe mo t- fa vored-n "";ion tre~.t ment f or American 
merc hants ,rhi ch Gush ing had obt a ined in th e Treaty of 
~anghia "expressed so exactly t he r eal inter es ts of 
Ameri cans that it sur vived f or a ce ntury. nl4 F'ro m t his 
ti me for war d , e ual commerc i al opportu..~ity in China was to 
be t he cardinal. princi ple of America's Far Ea tern policy.15 
In the strained atmos phere whi ch existed in China 
af ter the Treaty of Nanki ng , the occasion for a new war 
aga inst the Manc hus was not lo ng in pr esentin g itself . 
Pur ported i n sults to t he Britis h Crown and t h e ,ur der of a 
French Cat holic priest ,,vere t h e "conve nient prete xt s for 
armed action.«16 The ensuin g conflict was brief and 
12John \v. ia sl and, "Commercial In f luence Upon Far · 
~.astern Policy, 1937-1941, 1' The Pa ci fic Historical Review, 
XI (Se ptember, 1942},. p . 2$1. 
lJClyde, p. 131. 14Ibid., p . 129. 
United 
15A. Whitney Griswold, 7;he Far Easte!n Policy of the 
S:t~tes ( !fe1,,r Ycr-k: Harcourt, Brace & Co., I 938), p. b. 
-------
16c1yde, p . 152. 
decisive. In the tr aties of Tientsin (185S), tte Chinese 
Government was compelled to accede to an expansion of the 
principles and practices set forth in the treatie s of 1842 
and 1844. 
6 
Chine. was now fully opened to the inroads of foreign 
com,11erce, During the fifty yea .rs which followed the treaty 
settlements at Tientsin, China _was su bjected to polic ies 
whieh reduced its soverei gnty to a fiction .17 But at this 
moment, the eyes of America i.·:ere not upon China. A civil 
war was about to break upon the badly divided American 
.. epublic. And when that war had come and passed, the United 
States was well on t he ·way to beco ming an i ndustria l nation. 
At·tention for the :remainder of the nineteenth century ·would 
be turned inward upon self-development r ather than upon 
the commerci al pros pects tha.t lay beyond the broad Paci fi c. 
Althou gh exports from the United States to China had 
increased rapidly during the fifteen yea .rs after the 'Treaty 
of Wanghia, rising from $2,276,000 in 1845 to $8>906,00O in 
1860, the Civil War was to bring a change. 'l'he next thirty 
years or so were to see exports fal l and a gen eral lan ... 
guishing of the China trade. Absorption of productive 
capacity in the develo pment of the American 'iest was th e 
pr i mary reason for t l1is decline.1 8 
17f arold s. Qui gley, Far Ea.ste rn ilar 
(Boston: World Peace Foundations, 1942, p , 
18charles s. Campbell, Jr., Speciq]_ Business 
Interests a.nd the Open Door f>oliey (New Haven: Yale 
University Pr~s , 1951}, p . 10. 
7 
The outco me of t his pro cess of internal development 
was the transformation of the United States i nto a great 
industrial nation. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
America was already ent ring into that pha ... -,c of mass 
produ ction 'It.hi ch was to g ive birth. to a rene1.-fed in terest in 
forei gn markets . 19 Exports to China shared in the gene ral 
expansi .on of f orei gn trade which had lain sta nant for the 
previous three decades. Between 1890 nd 1900, exports 
from the United St tes to China increased f ro m v?,385,362 
to 23,745,000. Durin g this sa me period, hm ever, America's 
total exports to all parts of the world rose .from ~~857, .502 ,548 
in 1e90 to 1,47 8 ,050,000 in 1900. 20 
Des)ite t h e fact that the China tra.de had recov0re<l 
and risen to new neigh ts in the decade prior to 1900, the 
combined imports and exports of the United St ates with 
China amounted to only 2 pe r cent of' total American forei n 
trade . The American -in ustrial and financial comm.unity as 
a -\,':hole paid little attention to tne Chi nes e market. 
Althou gh some bu '.lness grou ps expressed _ considera ble interest 
in the potential of the China trade, the "'undamental fact 
re mained that "China was a remote and relatively insignif--
icant province of American -economic ent er p:rise.u21 
Other forces wer e afoot, ho ~ ,ver, w·hich ·were to 
19F rley, Far Easter n Sur vey. V (Ju ly 29, 1936),1 62. 
20campbell, p . 10. 
21Gri SlJ old, n . 24 . 
8 
su pport the speculations of those business interests which 
envisioned. a bri ght future for American -enterprise in China • 
. 
As a result of the Spanis h - American War 1 the nation became 
increasin gly conscious of the Far East . 22 The United States 
emerged from the war as a power having i mportant territorial 
interests in Asia.23 Those business circles in the United 
St ates whic h constantly stres sed the value of the China 
marke t to America's continued prosperity combined with the 
small but vocal expansionist cli que to press for the 
annexation of th~ Philip pines.24 Both the desire .for the 
annexation of the Phi li ppine s and the desire f or a r or e 
spirited defense of American ri ghts and interests in China 
were co- products of the expans ionist impulse of th e 
· ·d 25 perio. Although this grou p was sma.llt it can be credited 
with producing a cl imat e of opinion favorable to the 
ado ption of the Open Door Policy by the administr a tion of 
President Ntlliam 1>1cKinley. 26 
'fhe Doctrine of the Ope:n Door 
In the last two dec ades of the nine tee nth century, 
China's hun'ili a tion had been made complete as the insa-
tiable hung er of the Western powers f or empire drove them 
to tear away are as over whi ch China exercised _suzerainty . 
In 1ag4, France seized I ndochina. Two years 
' 22c b J amp el., p . 41 , 
23Far ley, Far Easte rn Survex, V (July 29• 1936), 162. 
24Masland, 1rhe Pa cific His torical Review, XI 
(September, 1942), 82. 
25Griswold, p . 26. 2:6ca mpbell, P • 1. 
later, Burm.a "icls absorbed int ·o the Britis h Errrpire. Japan 
provoked a war i n H~94, ·.rhich ended ~ i th Ch i na 's loss of 
Formosa 1 its forced re.c c)gn iti,on of Korean 1rindependence, tt 
an d, to make Pe kin gt s sham e eomplet~, t he imposition o·f a 
lar ge ca sh i de mnity. ·, ·. enever China resisted, it was 
dealt ·with the ore harshly, compelled t,o si n nore 
tttreaties,n 1'le se" mor e t erritory, and pay ore "ind.em ... 
nities.t,27 
9 
By 1S97 1 t h e oment se . nted. very near w1ten ·the Great 
Powers trmuld be .gin the actual annexa tion of t he ir 
res pe ctive ns phe r es of "nf'luence ." 'l"he de licate balan ce of 
power a1 ong t he Gre at Po1ers .in China see med on the ver e 
of coll apse, and i n all pro babilit y the .extinction of 
Chinese independen ce would . f ollo w.2S China's qua si-colo-
nial position resul t d not only fr .om t he spheres whi ch the 
owers had carved out over a fj_fty year period but als o 
f ro m the treaty ri ,hts that had been ,;rung from the 
deel i ning Manc hu s. Extr at .er r itoriality was the . ost exten• 
sive ·of these privile ges , but there were al s o t ariff 
re str i cti ons , am:1 t h e ri ght s of coastal and river nav-
igation, of ar riso ni ng troops, and of es t ablishin g a postal 
sy5tem. Th e United States had sha red in t his com ... l ex of 
prero gatives which so dra stically li mited China's freed om 
of a.ction.29 But wher eas the European states had carved 
27For man Harrison, Changing Chi na Ofow York: Crown 
Pub liti h in g Co., 19L}8 ), P • 44• · 
2Scampbell, p .. 25. 29Quigley, PP• 34-35. 
10 
t heir initials upon China by ar kin g of f spe cial encl av es 
of i:i;iflue nce, th 0 Unite d ...,tatcs had denied it s elf t his type 
of concession.30 
By 1$9$ , the n 1 all the salien t fea tures of th e Far 
Ea.stera pol icy of t he United St ate s had virtually j elled. 
=quality of commercial op~or tunity, not territorial cqui-
sitio n , was Americ 's obje ctive., Pc~ace, amity, and trad e 
form ed the bed -roc k of United State s • pol i cy to ward Cb.ina,31 
But a ha l f -c entury of gradu 1 en croac hments upon Ghina 's 
terrj.tories was apparent ly about to ter min ate in a f lurry 
of land - r bbin whi ch would spell an end to Chi na' s ter -
r i tori al i ntegrity . Thes e devel opments alarmed American 
merc hants and issio :riaries al i ke, bot h roups fea ri ng t.hat 
they would be eliminated fr om t he 0 lo riou s futur e in China 
whi ch both env isioned. Appea ls were made tote State 
Departmen t to intervene i n the cours e of even ts. The 
British, who had a much vaster tr ade and f in::incial stake in 
the Chinese Empir e , added t he ir exhort ation$ to th e cl.a-
mor.32 Thus it was th at Grea t Brit a in, w ic h had consid-
era ble . int erests throughou t all of Asi a , and the United 
States, whic h h1· d 1egl igab le interests but " garg antuan 
exnect atio ns li found re aso n to make common cause aga inst ~ ' 
York : 
30Gris old, P • 6 . 
J2Thomas A. Baile y , Th,e. an in'- the ... ,tr eet ( New 
The ~a cmillan Co., 194 8 }, P • 28 0 . 
11 
further infri ng .ments u_ on China's t a.tter .ed sovereignty.33 
Secretary o·f . State John Hay, worki n0 in close 
colla borat io n 1,tith the British, p enned the first of th e 
fa nous Open Door notes in 1899. In these notes, Hay urg ed 
the powers to acc ept th e ide al ;f c~mmercial equality in 
China. Althou gh most of the Gre a,t Powers a ccepted th 
princ i ple of co. ITTJ.ercial e uality only ·with extensive qua l-
ific ations, Hay publicly announced th at he had received 
repli s fro m the powers whi ch were "fi nal and definitive.tr 
~hen the Boxer Rebel lion flared up in China only months 
lat;er in 1900, Hay announced--U is time witho ut benefit of 
notes to the other pow rs--t ha t the Open Door h d be en 
extend ed ,to include t he ter r itorial integrity of China, as 
well as equality of commercial opportunity within the 
Chine se Empire. 11Thus, on the rushing tide of dramatic 
events, the ne-w Open Door was floa ted be.fore the public 
gaze.« 34 
'rhe popu lar notion pe rsists that Hayts pen ha.d 
effected the rescue of China at a t i me when its enouement 
appea red certai n. Such was hardly the cas e, however. 
China was to a large egree the benefici ar y o:f the gro wing 
ri valr ies among the Great O:ters of ,urope • In tl-i.eir 
ef f orts to make certai n t ha t none C-.)ained any undue 
33 ob rt B. Osgood, Ideals and Self-I nterest in 
Amer ic a 's Eoreign Rela.ti.ons _{ .... O'""·h ... i..... c_a_g_o_:_....,,,r=li-e-. ...,u,...n-i~'v-e--r-· s..-it-y-of 
Chica go Pr ess, 1953}~ p . 61. 
34Baile y , pp , 2$6-87 s 
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advanta ge, they effectiv ely prev ented each other from 
pursuing their te rr itoria l asJirations in China .35 The 
doctr itre -i.··as no more effective than the power of Gre at 
Britain and t h e United ;:,-tates t o ba ck it up , and the Uni ted 
States di d not hav e the armed str ength to rescue Chi na ha d 
Hay' s bl uff boen cha l lenged . In point of fac t, 1'n e ithe r 
Hay nor any other American of ficial had any intention of 
en forcin g it if ca lled to book-"36 
Furt hermor e:, it should be note -d that until 1900 , 
America' s res pe ct. for Chlna r s terr i torhll i nt egrity was 
merely a self -i mpose~ re gulation . The United States was 
under no obl i fl"ation to rush to China' s defense if anoth er 
power or c o ,binati -on of powers t r ea t ened to di~membe r it. 
As lon g as t he United States pursued this policy, it was 
able to remain free of ser ious i nvolvement in the politi cal 
entan gl ements of Ea st ern As ia . .But rith Hay's pronounce-
ment th at the Ameri c an policy of the Open Door no\": includod 
the territ ori al in te grity of China, su ch a de gree of 
detachment in the fu ture ·would be virtually i mpossible .3 7 
The Open Door an d Sin o- American 
Economic Rel at io ns, 1900~1931 
Threats to China 's territorial integrity and 
America 's commerce, however, were not to cease at the 
flourish of & pen. Theodore Roos eve lt's f ir st i mpulse 
35Ihid., p . 287 . 36osgood, P• 62. 
37Griswold, P-• 7, 
durin g t h e Russ o-Ja panese War of 1904-1905 had been to 
favor Japan so that Rus si a's hold on 1~1an churia might be 
weakened and the Open Door thereby protectect.38 Russia 's 
ef f orts to restrict American commercial enterpri se in 
i ,an chur i a had been analyeed a,·~ but one expre ssion of t he 
cz arist government's desire to dominate all Horth China. 
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The treaty of pea ce its elf, whi ch had been concluded under 
the mediation of President . oosev elt, contained a provision 
binding Japan and ussia ttnot to obstruct any ~eneral 
measures common to a ll countries, which China may take for 
the develo pment of the commerce and industry of r"'ianehuria. u39 
President William Howard 'l'aft' s policy of Dollar 
Diplomacy as it ·ms made manifest in China was an aggressive 
but ill-conceive d attem pt to ro mote Americ an ca pital by 
insistin g upon the ri ::·ht of Americ an int erests to partic-
ipate in a t hree- power consortium to build the Hukuang 
r ai l 111ay. His efforts had been succeeded by the even more 
inept attempts by his ecretary of State , Philander G. 
Knox, to interest several powers in a fin an cial sc_eme to 
tear the 1• nchurian r ail ways away from Russian and Japanese 
contro1.40 Both ef f orts proved unsuccessful, wit h t he 
erst 1h ile ene mies, Russia and Ja pan, cooperating to defea t 
39T. A. Biss on , American Poli ex in the J:l"ar East, 
19;1-1940 (New York: Institute of Pa cific Rel atio n s, 
1940), p . 9. 
40os good, p . 103. 
this plan t o international:J.ze the 1 an churian railway sys-
tem. 41 
14 
Durin g t he first four years of :,'oodrow ~ ilson' s 
admi nis trati on , Taft's • olicy of Dollar Di,plomacy in China 
w s discontinu ed .Li-2 i ilson had insiste .d that the financial 
adventures in China which the p rec .eeding administration had 
championed be halted because of "the stringent controls it 
involved over t he Chinese Admi11istration.f -143 In 1917, h ow ... 
ever, ·Tilso n de pa rted sharply .from hi s po licy of al0 -o.fness 
to international financial pr ojects in China. Secretary of 
State Robert _Lansin g ga ve notice to Ameri can bankers and 
forei gn governments that the United Stat es was .interested 
in Jo inin g in the crea .tion of a new co.ns ortium ba s ed upon a 
broa der membership and upon conditions that would not depre-
ci te China's sovereignty. This abrupt shift in attitude 
grew· out of new ap prehension for .-the Open Door 1hich had 
been eng endered by the Chinese Governm.ent' s reckless 
borrowing from Japanese banks . The Chines e Gover nment, 
ho·wevar, was not interested in the new consortium and the 
proposal came to noth~ng .44 
Both Taft and 1/Jilson had attempted to i mple m(!mt the 
' 
poli cy of the Open Door by interjeetin g American influence 
in the form of private participation in lar ge loans to the 
Chinese Government, and by encouraging direct inv estments 
4-lnu i gle y, p . 3 7. 
43Quigley, p . 37,, 
ll-2Bailey, p . 240 • 
44:tbid., p . 39. 
- . 
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by Amertcan buc;inessmen., B, th pre side nts ha..- been t hwarted 
in thej_r efforts 1 ar ely b cau ,-e of t he apat hy of Ameri can 
inv est ors for such pro,j ec·ts, an indifferc.:i:nce whic h was 
ba sed pa rtl y u on the 1 no wleJ .ge of the exte ns ive invest-
ments by other sta tes already existing in · hina 1 and pa rtly 
u on the traditi on of "av0idance of forei gn entang le ments .• " 
These obst acles ~laced the Department of St ate in t he 
position of having to must er k-'ublic opi nion in sup port of 
this new departure into world affairs.45 Public opinion, 
however, l ar gely turned against Dollar Di plo macy.46 
Invest ments i n. Cnina re mained small urin g this period, and 
the United St ate s was forced to content itself wit h the 
more li mited objective of merely acting as a brake upon the 
more ag gr essi ·ve powers.A,? 
Although few commerci al groups in ·the United Stat es 
believed i n the viability of' t he China , e.rket, the Amer_ican 
Government id not f a :i.l to provide the necessary ag encies 
and facilities for t he pro moti on of Chinese-A mer:lcan 
commercial r elatio ns . Di plo matic of f icials concern ed with 
Far Eastern affairs during the firs t several decades of the 
twentieth cent ury w re moti v:::1ted by the basi c assu mption 
that China wold one day be a great market capable of 
4.5Ib id., p . 36. 
46samuel 1''lag g Bemis, The United States as a World 
Power: A Di:olomatic Histor 190C3-I 5 {New York: · Henry 
.;;.,,.;:;~;,;;;:..,;:__,,,..;;,;..~~;;;..;;,;:~;:;.=.~'""'"r'~...;:;. ......... _,_.::;.._......,. ................ 
olt & Co., 1955, P• 1. 
47Qui gle y , p . 36. 
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absorbing vast amount s of American products.48 Government 
of f icials wrote pamphlet s givin g details on every phase of 
co t · er c i al life . in Ch i na , invariably po i nti ng out the rtvast 
opportun i t ie s for ind us tri a l development , tt outlinin g t h e 
fa ci lities availabl e to Americans resident in China , and 
even optimisti cally suggestin g a criteria for t h e sele cti on 
of the busin es s r epresent tive in Chi na . 49 
The commerci alized co astal re g ion of Ch ina v;as t he 
site of most of the markets for manufa ct ured goods comin g 
from the Unit ed States. 50 It v.·as in t his area that trade 
pro motio na l or ga nizations and a ctivities t ere con ce ntrated. 
A re present at i ve of the D~part ment of Commerce was sent to 
t he ancient ca pital c ity of Peki ng i n 1914 . Americ an 
Chambers of Commerce wer e functioning vi gorously at 
Shan ghai , Tientsin , Hankow, and Peking by the ear ly 1920's, 
By 1925, Americ an tr ade commissioners located in Shangh ai 
and Cant on wer e com il in g a mont hly res ume of th e Chlna 
tra de for general distri bu tion among all Americans des ir ing 
suc h infor mati on . 51 
48r~Ias land, The Paci fi c Historical n evie w, XI 
( Sept ember, 1942); 2 93. 
49see Julean Arnol d 1 Ch ina 'rr ade B~act s, U, S . Dept . 
of Commerce, Bureau of Forei gn and Domesti c Commerc·e 
0 as h in ,t on: U. S . Government Pri nting Off ice • 192 5}. 
50~'falter A. Radiu s, 11United Stat es Trad e and t he 
Sino-Ja pan ese War,"' Far Easte r n Survex, VII (Ja nuary 5, 
1938) , 2. 
51Arnold , p . 12. 
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Official encoura gement, however a was not enough tel 
stimulate greater American business activity on the China 
main land. While total American investments abroad rose 
very rapidly after 1914--from $2,500,000,000 t ,o more than 
$16,000,000,000 in 1930--less than $200,oootooo (excl usive 
of missionary, medical, and educational enterprises) was 
invested in China . Only ,ii>40,000 _1000 of this total was in 
t h e form of loans. 52 In comparative terms, this ruean ·s that 
of all the foreign invest ments in China as of 1930; only 
6.1 pe r cent were Ariteriean,53 By contrast, Britis h fi-
nan ci a l interests in China were six and on-e- ha lf times as 
great -as -American holdings in 1931. Totalin g nearly one 
billion dollars, British holding s constitut ed 39 per eent 
o.f all foreign business i nves tments in China. The Ja panese 
were next ·with 37 per eent of the tot-al, while Russian in-
vestments were a poo-rthird with 11 per cent.54 
About four ... fifths of' all American investments in 
China were in bua.iness concerns:. bankst p1.1blic utilities., 
shipping, tebacco companies, oil stations, newspapers, and 
small factories. The$e direct business investments by 
private American concerns totaled approximately $160,000 1000 
or about 80 per eent ·of all American commerc.ial int ,erests 
52Qui gley, p •. 40. 
'' William w. Lockwood Jr., «America's Stake in the 
Far East, ,· II: · Investments," Far Ea!:?tern Survey, V (August 
12, 19361, P~ 181, 
54(\. 1 - 41 "'i:ui g ey, P• - • 
1, 
in China. 5 5 The remainin g 20 per cent, or about ,~,4-0, 000 ., 000, 
was in portfolio investments. This same r atio of direct to 
portfolio investments held true for a11 forei gn investors 
in China in 1930.56 
On the eve of Ja pan's invasion of Iv an churia in 19.31, 
American concerns made two major in~est ments in China . 
Doth invest ments were located in Shan ghai, long the fo cal 
point of Ameri can co mer cial activity in China . In 1929, 
two lar g e Ameri can utility companies ac quir·ed a controlling 
intere st in the Shanghai Power Company under terms which 
ga ve the company a monopoly in supplyin g ele ctric power to 
the International et t leme nt at Shanghai. One year later, 
the American-m ·med International 'l'elep hone and Telegraph 
Cor por ation purchased the Shan gh ai Mutual Tele phone Com-
pany , a tr an saction ·which eave the Americ n concern a dom-
inai;it intere st in the tele phone service su pplied to the 
large foreign community in Shangha.;i.. These two transactions 
substantially increa s ed t he American stake in the interna -
tionally controlled city~57 
The Rivalry of Japan and the 
. Uni ted St ates in East Asia 
Ja pa n had emerged as the chief challeng er of the 
-- ------------------- --------
China: 
178. 
55 uigley, p. l"O. 
56t• ei Ying -lin, China nnd f orei gn Capi tal ( Chun gking, 
China Institute of Paci fic Relatio ns, 1945), p . 43. 
57Lockwood, E.~r Easte rn Surv ey, V (August 12, 1936), 
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Open Door in C!dna fro i t he early cays of the twentieth 
century. At t he outb r eal of the HUsso - Ja.panese v a:r in 
1904, President Theo dore Roosev elt and t,he gr eat mas$ of 
the Arneric an eopl e lad favored the Ja pan ese, who were 
regarded as . a civil izing fo rce at work i n the Far Eas t, and 
had opposed the Russians, who were looked upon a s r:,;emi ... 
barbari c a.nd a threat to American commerci al intere 0 ts sit-
mated in Ma.nchuria . 58 1fir •. Rooseve lt soon reali i ed, how-
ever, t hat the Open Door- po li .cy had not been st.rEmgthened 
by the substitution of Japan for Russ ia in t an ch ur ia. 59 _·. ; 
From the sta ndpoi nt of IL~erica's lon g-ran ge inter-sts in 
the Far East , Roosevelt gr was anx i ous to restrain Ja an 
as he had been to ch eck the advances of the Russian bear. 60 
From t h is ti me on , relations bet.ween Ja pan £\U' t he Unit~d 
St ates steadj_ly i.1mr sen ed. 'rh e Oryen Door pol t cy beGame 
increasingly a. barrier to Ja panese advances on the . Asian 
conti nen t• 61 
Joto ly did Japan come to re sent America's 
posi tio n i n Ch:l.na ~nd ·the l<ar East. as a whole , but i t also 
became convin ced tha t all forei··n inv~stors in China were a 
pote nt ial threat to the continued economic pr ospe rity of' 
58osgood, p . 67. 
59sa muel Fl agg Bemis, American ·Fore i i:rn Policy and 
Di2lo macy (New York: Henry Holt & Go., 1959) , p. 357. 
60osgood, p . 67. 
61Bemis, American Fore i gn Policy, P• 356. 
the Japanese Empire . As Japan had grm •m more 5.ndustrializ ed 
durin g the last three decades of the nineteenth century and 
had ado pted the techniques of mass product.ion , it had 
beco me increasin gly pressed to .fi nd comm.odity outlet~ on 
the Asian mainland . 62 Japan had 1.,~1erefore come to re gard 
the presen .ce of other powers in China as inimical to i.ts 
own vital interests.-
During World War!, Japan ma.de its first serious 
challenge to th e Open Door when it lod ged t he no·torious 
Twenty ... One Demands against China. These exactions wer e so 
far--reaching in character that if the young Chinese Republic 
had been compelled to a cce pt them .io. tot o, China would have 
become .a. virtual Japanese prote ctorat e. 63 Here aga i n, how ... 
ever, the Open Door poli cy was used to block Japan's 
ambitious efforts to gain suzerainty over China. As soon 
as the content of the rrwenty - One Demands w1a.s made -publ ic, 
Seqretary of State William Jennings Bryan, in a note 
disp~tched on Murch 13 , 1915, informed both China and Japan 
that the Unite d States Gover nment would not reco gnize any 
a greem~nt or undertaking which would i mpair ''the treaty 
ri ghts of t he United States and its citizens in China, the 
political or territorial integrity of the- Republic of 
China , or t he international pol i cy relative to China 
62charles A. Beard, American Forei n Poli G-
Making, 19,3:?- 1940 (New Haven : 
p . 112 . 
63Ben~is , Th~ United States as a World Power , p •. 210. 
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com.monly _ knoi n as t he Open Door polic y .» 64 The subsequent 
labors of American di plomacy, moreover, succeeded in 
persuad i ng Japan to withdraw those demands whi c would have 
been fatal to Chinese soverei •nty. Although the United 
States could not ... re vent Chi n 's aceept-an ce of the remaining 
demands, the Americ'"'n Government had once again bl ocked 
Japan 's prin ci pal nation~l obje ctive: to i,-ain astery over 
China. 6; Dec;pite this se t back on the Asian nk inl and , (Jap n 
em~r ged from the Fi r st vrorld War nwit,h an eau&lity in po,ter 
and ·urestige" that could not be denied. Jap n's new 
posit ion of stren gt h and th 0 increa""i ng rivalry between the 
United St<:'tes and Japan in the Far East led shortly to the 
·
11ashin gton Naval Conference of 1921-1922. 66 
'l.'he agree ments reached at Haslingt◊n in early Feb-
ruary, 1922, ended the eriod of crisis in Eas t As:i.a wh:i.ch 
ad emer ged as a by- product of the war in Euro pe.,67 The 
three princi al treaties whi ch resulted from the conference 
re pr ·EfGented an effort to strike a com:: ro mise between Ja.p.an 
and ·the estern powers. The Five Power r aval Treaty 
between t1e United States, Great Britain, Ja p n, Fran ce, 
and Italy, declared a te n year 11naval holiday" during which 
no nel'.l capital ships were to be bui lt, an d imposed a ratio 
64B· 12 isson, p. • 
65Bemis, The United States s a World Power, p , 210. 
66B . . A . er.us, merJ.can For ei~n ~olicy, p . 456. 
67Bisson, p . 13. 
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of 5-5-3-1 .75-1. 75, res pectiv ely, on ca pital ship tonnage.68 
The ter ms of t he Four Power Tr eaty con stituted a multi ... 
lateral pled ge bet rnen the three great naval owers and 
France re g··.r di ng the insul r possessions in the Paci fi c. 
The f our st ates agreed to re spect each other's ri ghts in 
ins ul ar possessions in the Paci f ic re gi on and to consult 
to gether if those ri ghts beca me the subject of controversy 
or should be thr ea tened by an outside power. A t hird a"'ree-Q 
ment, t he Ni ne Po 'ler Tr ea ty, e1 bodied the most swee ping 
af f irmation of th e America n pr inci ple of the Open Door ever 
made. All the na tio n s a sse mbl ed at as hin gton agre ed to 
re sp ect the territori al and administrative inte grity of 
China , a s well a s e !uality of commerci al oppor tunity within 
China . 69 The s pecial treaty privile ges ~ hich had been 
wrun g f'ro m Chlna in years past were not touched by t his 
pact , however . 
The rras hington Conf erence allow ed the United States 
to r etreat from "active di plo macy in the Far .Eastrt by 
aking the Americ an olicy of t he Open Door the r espon-
s ' bility of all the owers whi ch subscribed to the Nine 
Power Treaty. •rne United St ates 1"ras thus no lon ger the 
sole guardian of t hose pri nci ples embodied wit hin the Open 
Door. The nav al li mit ations i m osed by the Five Power 
'l1reat y , moreov ·er, made it i mpoRsi ble for the American Gov-
ernment to defend the O en Door, 70 This co nd ition ,_ 
6gos good, p . 339. 69Ibid . , p . 340 . 
70Bemis, American Foreign Policy, P• 460. 
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however, wa.s not substantia lly different from that whi ch ha d 
exLsted pra.or to t he Conference; the Unit(jd States ha d 
never been suffi ci ent l y pm·1erful to suBta.in the Open Door. 
nFrom the ti me of Hay's ori ginal announcement of the Open 
Door olicy no Ameri can states man had ever contemplated its 
enforcement: the Five Power Treaty i d not change th is 
situation.n71 
Americats frustrating intervention in the episode 
of the Twenty-- One Demands in 1915, President ' 'Iils on' s 
attem pt to revive the four-power consortium in 1917, the 
disturb in g presence of Amer ican troops in Siberia imme-
diatel y following r;Jorld far I, and the res ·trictions 
theoretically i mposed upon Japan at the la shington Confer-
ence in 1922, pe rsua ded the Japanese that they had found an 
ant agonist in the United States . 72 It was the diplomatic 
ef forts of the United States, then, rat he r than the extent 
of American investments, which ultim ately convinced the 
Japanese th at Americ an policy was desi ~ned to f rustr at e 
t heir expansion in China and throughout the Far East.73 
71osgood, p. 341. 
73Quigley, p . 36. 
CHAP'l' R · II 
The Manchurian Crisis e.nd United States Policy 
On the night of Septe ber 18, 1931, Japan went on 
the ra.n1page in Ma,nchur:ta, The contest between the -· 1-
24 
i tal;":tsts and the oderates which had been cons tar1t in twen-
tieth centu ry Jap an had turned once · again .... -and for the last 
time--to t he favor of the expansj .onists, 
In the deca e be ore the thrust in Manchuria, the 
moderate s had dir ect ·d the fortunef of the Ja p&nese Empire . 
The agree .m0nts .ad e t, Waahin./:,'ton in 1922 ha d been a umodel 
of fr iendl y cancili tion" involvin g compromises by the gov ... 
ernment in Tokyo which no mi li t ristic re gim e 1~rould have 
per mitted.,l To be sure, t.he years b efore 1931 hac seen no 
r etre at on th e part of the Japan se .f-rorn their deter.r uination 
to ID<· inta:tn the sp~cial positi on whi ch they had achteved in 
r, anchuria at such a cost in the usso ... Japanese ~far of 
1904-1905. But Japanese f or e · g.n policy in the pe ;r·iod 
bef ore the !.anchurian incident had been _;uided by men who 
had attem pted to fi nd a solution to t he" ·anchurian prob-
lem" by conciliatory means . 'rhB milit arist cli que, 
1Henry 1.. Sti mson and McGeor ge Bundy, On Active · 
Service In Peace and 1fa ;t ( e1t1 York: Harp er & Bros., 1947), 
P •· 224. 
25 
however, had conti nua lly sou ght to re place the eco nomic 
objectives of the modera t es ,-Jith a pro ram of active imper-
ialism. In the parl nee of the extre mist; s t they were 
determined to undert ke a more "positive" course of action 
in r-ianchuria. 2 
The grind:i:ng circu mstances which resulted from a 
worl -wid e economic depression did much to di"cr edit the 
moder ates in the eyes of the Ja pa nese peo le. Between 1929 
and 1931 the forei gn ·trade of Ja_ an, vastl y i mpor t ant to 
th at maritime na.tion, •1as slashed in ha lf. When other 
nations s ought t,o expor t the depression by r a isin g prohib -
itive tari ff barriers aga inst i mports--a beggar-my ... nei ghb or 
polic y which the United States itself ado ,.,..ted ... -the Ja panese 
econo my fe lt the pinch . Under su ch conditions, Ja pane se 
opinio n moved away from its f ormer a ccept ance of a pro gr am 
ba~ ed upon the peacef ul purs uit of trade abr oad. 
The expansionists had been ready at hand with an 
alternative pro gram of f orceful impBrialis m whic h they 
pr esGnted in lo win g terms to a people stricke n by econo mic 
bl i ght ,3 Mith a f ing er on t h e pulse of the nation, the 
Ja panese milit arists had moved decisively in mid-Se pte mber, 
1931, swiftly over-runni ne; the J4anchurian provinces of 
China, and presant ing in short order th eir people and the 
"1'0r ld t.rith a fait accomp li. The gover nment in Tokyo, which 
at the last minute ha d le rned of t he plot and ha.d 
attem pted desperately to sto p it, f elt compelled to r at ify 
26 
t he a ct ion "doub tless in the convi ction th at if it did not 
a revolt of t he Army would ensue.n4 
The official Americ n response to Ja nan's assaul t 
upon Mane uria c ame on J--nuary 7 , 1932 in a note which vfas 
de liv ered to bot h China and Ja pan . T .sis caveat, whi ch had 
been prepared by Secr et ar y of, t a te Henry L. Stimson at t h e 
irection of Pre sident Hoov er, infor med both pa rties that 
the United ..,.,tates woul not reco gn ize the l e·: lity of any 
de f a cto situ at ion nor of any treaty or agree ment which 
.. ·i ht i mDair ''the treaty r:Lgl ts of the United t 2tes or its 
citiz en s in China, inclu di n0 those whi ch relate to the GOV-
erei gnty, the indepen dence, or the territori 1 an d admin-
istrative inte grity of t he epublic of China."5 
T1is was th e Sti mson doctrine of nonrec ognition. 
Sti mson hi mself, how~ver, ave full cre di t to •illia m 
Jennings ryan for providin g hi m with a precedent of non-
reco gnition in the Far Eas t. T·hen J apan had lod ged its 
notor:tous 'rwenty-,._ne DeLan s aga inst Chin a in 1915, Bryan 
had no tified both China and Japan . th a t t h e United .:.:,tates 
,1ould not reco gn ize any agree ment which vi ol at ed American 
ri g ts und er t h e Op en Door •. 6 
Secr eta r y Sti mson ha d van t.ed to ha lt t;he Japan ese 
4Jos ph v • Ballanti n e, ·rttlukden to Pear l H- rbor : 
The Foreign Policies of Ja p n," For ign Af airs, .. , II 
(July, 1949), 652 . 
5sti mson, pp . 235-)6 . 
6cordell Hull, The 'emoirs of ordell Hull, I (New 
York: The ~ a cmillan Co ., 1948) , 270. 
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by takin g mor e f orce .ful measures ag:;a inst their imper ialis tic _ 
advan ce s in };an churia. Butt .he mer l can people were "in no 
mood to depart fro m the non-ent ngl ement tr adition."7 The 
Gr ea t Depress i on had a:iv en rise to a ,.l ethor a. of domesti c 
probl ems whi ch had t urned a tr aditionally i solati onist 
people even more in upon the mselves . Sti mson .him""elf 't-1rote 
in Move mber of 1931 t,ha.t ttt h e polic y of imposing san ctions 
of f ore ~ ••• had been rej ect ed by Americ a i n its 
rejection of · the League of Nati ons. tt8 The Ameri can peo pl e, 
Sti mson wrote , ha ttcteliber ,: tely chosen" to rely · solely 
upon treati e s "h i ch had a chieved the ,dl nction of rrpubl ic 
opinion a.lone. n9 
Wit h t hi s ba ckgroun d of po pular sentime,t , the 
Sti mson doct rine of non reco gn :l.ti on achieved consider ab le . 
poLul ar su_J.ort i n th~ United States . Aggr essive measures 
which ri ght ha ve provoked war ·were neatly avoi ded and yet 
the moral posit ion of the Uni ted 0t a tes was se cure. The 
poli cy had onl y one f l aw: it did not to , t he Ja pane se 
mi li t a rists ttf or as much as f i ve 1,im .:1.te::,n in Manchuria or 
else whe re.10 With ea ch new rep ort of Japanes e. adva nces in 
iV;an chur ia and wi t h mount in g evid ence that th e Japanese f or-
eign offic e was swi ng-i ng i n beh ind th e militarists, i t 
be came i ncrf.~~-::,in r.rly cle ar that the f orce s of moder·ation 
wit hin the Imp- rial Government had failed in t h eir efforts 
7 . 8 Bailey, P• 249 . Sti mson, P• 244. 
9Ibid., 10J3ailey, P• 2gl. 
to re gain aut ½ority.11 
No matter what illus·ono the ~merican people might 
entertain about the ef f ica cy of nonrecognition, Sti mson was 
aware of its severe limitations . 'fh e pol:i. cy served as a 
purely moral weapon designed "less as a method of bring i ng 
the Japanese to reason than as a method of reasserting the 
American conviction th a t no good whatever couJ.d come from 
the bre a ch of treaties . nl2 '!'he United States h d spoken up 
in efense of international morality , but in terms of 
diplomacy it had hardly been very successful . By mid - Jan-
u ry of 1932, Ja pan had achieve a complete m"J.it ar y and 
dip lo matic victory in Man churia. The government in 'l'okyo 
had e f fectively resisted all atte mpts by other nation s of 
the world to intervene in Japan's military penetration of 
the Asian mainlanct . 13 
As for the threat which Japan's invasion of 
Manchuria might pose to Americ an commercial interests lo-
cated there , 1anchuria was not in 1931 nor indeed had it 
ever been a factor of much ec onomic significance f or the 
United States, either in terms of American trade as a 
whol e, or in terrns of i mports or exports of any i mportant 
com,_11odities.1 4 To Sti mso n's vay of th i nking , the 
fund amental f actor at st ake was American presti e;e in China 
and throughout th e Far East , a fa ctor of su ch i mportan ce 
that it tr anscend ed in his mind any i mmediate damage which 
llstimson, p . 228. 
13
.!J2i£., p . 239. 
14Farley , Fa~ Eastern Surve x. V (July 29, 1936) , 163. 
mir.rht be done to Ameri can tra e in Manchuria. It as hi s 
convict ion that, int e final analy~is, a ll of America's 
material interest s in East ts i a hi nged u on ret ai ning the 
29 
-r es-ti g ,., whi ch the Unite d States enjoy e1d ·'by virtu e of its 
tr a iti onal su .,port of Chin a 's territ ori al and admi nlstra -
tive i nte gr i ty .nl5 He beli eved th t if China 's sovereignty 
and inde nend.ence were allo wed to bed trc y ed by Japanese 
ag re ssion, the future of the Uni ted States in the Far East 
would be pl aced i n s eriou s jeop rdy; a stru ggle betw een 
China and Japan mi ght not only destroy the ttpoten ti a ll y 
pr ofi t ab le" commerci al r l at:ton s between China and t he 
Unite d Sta t es , but might even constitute a dange r to 
America's territorial pos se ssions in tha t region . For 
Sti mson, t hen, Americ an polic y could not be based upon any 
narro w appraisal of what t e Americ an corn·1ercial cornmunity 
stood to los e by Ja.pEm's war in Man churi·,. It was by 
insisti 1g u on a close res pe ct for ::.nternat:i.onal order and 
stability t h~t American pre sti ge and , conse uent ly , 
Americ a' s mat rial int ere st s throus-·hout Eas t Asia could 
best be ser ved . 16 
In formulatin g h i s polic y , S·ti mso:n had be en ti gh tly 
encircle d by t he pr evailing t erirpera ment of t he Amer i can 
peopl e, 'rhe dominant tho ugh t of the period urroundin g t he 
Manchur i an crisi s was all for avoidance of Leagues and 
_, _____________________________  
15osgood , p , 353 . 
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tr eat ies or ·YlY agree ment wl ich i mplied commit ment s.17 
Lar ge l y for t ' is r eason , it canno t be sa id t h t th e .~merican 
·overnment , be t wee n 1921 and 1933 > a.dvan ced very far toward 
t e conce pt of coll ectiv e secur i ty . 1'he dictum t at America 
should retai n its "freedo m of a ctio nt th orou ghly dominated 
Unit ed St ates policy. The clim ate of opi ni on r an stron ly 
a P."ai nst takin g part in any common action a ai nst an 
a,ggressor~lB Unab.le to de fy such a power f ul b or y of · 
opinion, Stimson had t aken t' e only course he saw o~en to 
h:Lm: a gr and -scale affir mation of the United vt·tes' tra-
_i.tional policy of th e Open Door as expr es sed in the doc-
trine of nonreco gnit ion.1 9 
The lines ·were no IV cle arly drawn bet ween the United 
States and Ja pan . On one sj_de stood the United States, 
ersistent in its opp~i tion t.o any a ctio n which would 
thre aten the Chinese Republic's i nde penden ce and territorial 
inte grity. On th-e other stood Ja pan, irrit ated by the 
ttf:LctionsT! of the Nine Power Treaty an d unbending i n its 
det erm in atio n to impos .e a solution s i ngl e-h ndedl y upon the 
China problem . 20 After Janu ary, 1932, America's tradi-
tional sympathy for Chi na and its hatred of milit aris m and 
autocra cy be came incre as in gly important factors in the 
popular attitude toward Far Eastern policy.21 
17nexter Perkins, 'lThe Depar tment of St a te an d 
American Pub lic Opinion," 'l'he Di p lomats 1 19 -19 , ed. 
Gor don A. Craig, · an d Felix Gilbert · Pri nceton: · ·Princeton 
University Press, 1953), PP• 2S4-85. 
18Ibid., P• 298. 19ariswold, p . L~24. 
20sti mson, p . 255. 21osgood , p . 360. 
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'l'he moderate cabinet of Baron Shideha ra. fell from 
power on Deeember 11, 1931, It had fou ght a losing battle 
t-o r e ain control 01,er the military sin(te the ... eptember 
att a ck had be en 1.&unched against i anchuria. W-' th th last 
vesti g s of opposition r.moved, t he conques t of Manchuria 
11 a s ra pidly completed 1-•rith t e capt ure of Chinchm.,1 on Jan.-
uary 2, 193z.22 
The Open Door Closes In Manchuria 
It soon became clear th at Japan 's political and 
military control over Chin se territory was to be a.ccom-
:panied by the elimination of foreign bu sin ess and industry 
fr om the conquered ares. Forei gn trade ~as restricted to 
non-competitive commodities and t ho se items most ne ded by 
the Japanese to a$sist them in consoli at i ng the g ins thus 
far made. 23 Durin g the next several yea rs, Ja pan~s e 
capital invest ments in Manch ria reat:J_y incr e ed. 'By 
early 1935, Ja pan had achieved a vi~tual mono oly of 
lnvestments in 1 anchuria. All other forei gn int(irests, 
i ncl udi~g the small American one, steadily d i 1 inished in 
im ort nce.24 Foreign bankin g , trading, and construction 
concerns, findin g themselv s at a cc ns idera .ble dis a 'vantage, 
22 Gr i \Told, p , 1.,21. 
23 1Jilli am C. Jo nstone, The Uni t.ed States and 
Ja p ew O:rder ( fow York: Oxford University Pres s, 
194 , P • 142. 
24John R. Stewart, "Forei gn Inve stmen ts in 
r anchuria,n Far •astern $urvey, IV (June 5, 1935), 1. 
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began to 1.-.ri th draw . 2 5 
The Open Door for foreign investments in f-!anchuria 
had never , in fact,, been held Yery wide. In the da ys prior 
to Ja pan's mili tary conquest of the area in 1931, foreign 
trade and industry had been al most exclusively i n the hands 
of e ither the Rus sians or the Ja pan ese. 26 In 19.30, Japan 
held 70 er cent of all foreign invest ments in Manchuria, 
valued at an estimated 808 ,4 83,0 00 . Russia' s holdin gs 
constituted abou t 25 pe r cent of the ,-1hole , or approx-
i mat ely ;:-295, 000 , 000 . All other fo reign investments 
accounted "or less than 4 per cent of the total . 27 
Ameri can investments in I•-ianchuria at this ti me were 
esti mat ed at only ~;13 , 200 , 000., These business interests 
were predominately of a commerci al natur e. including oil, 
tobacc o, and mat ch distributi on, as well as banking faci l-
ities. The only American commercial interest in Manchuria 
of any real import ance, the profita ble field of oil dis -
tribution , was eli min at ed by ,the Ma.nchoukuo authorities in 
November , 1934, with the passage of an oil monopoly law. 
Under its provisions , the sale and· distribution oi' oil was 
made a govern ment monopoly . Forei gn compani es could 
continue to import petrol eum products , but only if they 
agreed to sell exclusively to the Manchoukuo Oil .onopoly 
25T. A. Bisson, ttAmerican Policy in the 1' .. a r Eas t," 
_Fqre i gn Poli.cy Reports, XII (Febru0.ry 1 , 19.37), 274. 
26stewart, Far Eastern ,..Survex, IV (~Tune 5; 1935)~ $1 . 
27 I' . d s·2 
--2!..:..,, p . . 
.f 
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Bureau.28 
The American Government made frequent protests 
against the a ppli cation of this lair on the grounds that it 
was a violation of the Open Door, a pro test echoed by Great 
Britain and t he ~et he:rland s,2 9 Tokyo replied th a t, , by 
refusi ng to r ecognize Manchoukuo, these po·wers had for -
fei ted their clai m to open door tre atment in that area .JO 
By mid- 1935, the Manchoukuo Oil Monopoly had succeeded in 
forcing th e Standar d-Va cuum Oil Company , the Asiatic Petro-
leum Company, and the Texas Oil Company t _o c ose the ir 
offices in Manchuria.31 
New Threats to the Open Door , 1934-1936 
In the spring of 19341 Ja pan made still anothe r 
atta ck upon the doctrine of th e Open Door . On April 17, 
Eiji Arnau; a spokesman for the Japanese Forei gn Jffice , 
rele ased a st at ement to the pr ess whi ch boldly put f orth 
Japan 1 s clai m to ex-elusive control in China .32 It acknow-
le dged _th t Japan had a "special posi tio n and miss ion• in 
Eastern Asia. The note cont ended that Japan ·was compelled 
to a ct "sin gle-hundedlyrt in order to mait : t ain peace and 
order in East Asia, a res pon sibility whi ch Ja pan shared 
177. 
1937), 
,:,g.,. . 6 
.., ,.1.bid. • p . o4. 
29Lockwood, :F'ar Eastern Survex, V (Aagust 12, 1936), 
30Gris wold , p . 442 • 
.31Bisson, Foreign Policy Re:eorts , XII (F ebruary 1, 
274. 
32T. A. Bi sso n , nstru g ,le of the Powers in Chin a," 
Foreign Pol i CY, Re:eo:rts, XII {August 1 , 1936} , 122-23. · 
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with China alone. The J apanese Gover nment would, there-
f ore, oppose any attem pt on the p . t of China to involv e 
other power s in wha.t was exclusively the duty o.f China and 
Japan • .3.3 
As for outside nations , the Amau state ment warn ed 
the m against undertaking any operations in China which 
might be prejudicial to Japanese i nterfsts, for under 
existing conditions even technical and financial assistance 
would acquire political si gnificance. Supplyin g China wi t h 
war pl anes, con. tructin g air dromes in China, sendin g military 
instructors or observers to China, - or contracting loans to 
provide fu nds f or political use would, the note concluded , 
tend to disturb the frie ndly rel ations between Chi na, Ja pan, 
and other countries, and woul d endanger the pea ce and order 
of Easter n Asia. Ja pan, therefore. would be opposed to 
such proje cts nas a matter of rinci ple.n34 
The Amau state ment was a direct challen ge to 
British and American ri ~hts and intere ~ta in China . 1 ore 
s ecifically, the ter ms of the pro nounce ment called into 
question tra whole series of American econo mic and eovern-
mental rel ations 1-1ith China.tr35 One ye ar earlier, the 
Chinese Govern ment had arr anged with the United States for 
a three-year, t;50,000 ,0 00 wheat and cotton credit to 
Nanking from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. In 
35I bid . 
-
35 
19301, the China National Aviation Corporat ion had been 
formed with 55 per cent of t his air li ne ovmcd by the 
l\fati on alist Government while the remainin g 45 pe r cent was 
hel d by Pan- Americ n Airway s. Toward the .end of 1933 , the 
Central Aircraft and Manufa ct uring Company had bee n or-
gan ized in China, wi th the Curtis s- WrL >ht Corporation 
ownin::, 64 pe r cent of t hi s air cr aft manufacturing plant , 
and t he Dougla s Airer ft Company controlling another 16 per 
cent . 36 By 1936 , this concern would be turning out sixty 
military air craf t a year for th e Nanki ng Gover nment , 37 
During 1932 and 1933 , mor eover , the Aeronauti cs Trade 
Di.vision of the Commerce Departm ent had cooperated with 
thes e American ai rcr aft corp or ation s i n the selection of a 
number of American aviation of f icers who assisted in estab-
lishing training schools fo r Chine se pilo ts.3S Duri ng th is 
s ame pe riod, the Selle of American - a i r cr a ft an d accessories, 
includin g mil it ary pla nes, had greatly expand ed, rising 
from '?2·07 , 000 in 1932 to · 2,359,000 i n 1933.39 
The Amau statement received ·world publicity . I ts 
c laim to Japane se pree min ence in East Asi a could not be 
allowed to pass unansiered . With in ten days , Sec retary of 
State Cor e ell Hull had formulated 'lashingt on 's official 
36Lockvi:rood, Far East er n Survey, V {August 12, 1936 ), 
123. 
37Bi sson, Foreip.;n Poli cy Reports , XII (August , 1936), 
38Bisson, Ii"orei gn Poli cy Reports, XII {February 1 , 
1936) , 275. 
39Bi s son, Foreign Poli cy Reports, XII (Augu st l , 
1936 ), 123. 
36 
response. On April 28, 1934, A ba ssador Joseph c. Grew, 
the r anking Ameri can official in Tokyo, deliver ed Hull's 
reply to the japanese Forei gn Off ice. In this note, Hull 
called attention to thr:i fact t ha.t the United States, by 
virtue of existi ng treaties, rtnad certain r ghts and 
obligationstt in China a.nd was associated vd 'th Ohina , Japan,, 
and o't,her nations in certain ultila:teral treaties relating 
,( 
:, 
to the Far East,40 No nation , Hull reminded Japan , could, 
without the consent of the other sta.t~s concerned, tt'ri ght-
fully endeavor to make conclu sive its will in situations 
where t here a re involved the ri ghts, the obli ga tions, and 
the le g iti mate interests of other sov erei gn states . tnli,l 
To t hi s communication, the Ja pan e se Government made 
no official res ponse, and the m~ tter ,ias a llo wed to rest. 
Hull had rGaf f'irmed American al le gian ce to the same prin-
ciples and t re aty ri ghts which Stimson had sought to uphold 
at the t ime of the Manchurian i n ci dent i n 19.31, The .United 
St ates Goverrunent had &P'ain r efus ed to re cognize Japan 1 s 
ri ght to disregard them.4 2 The imau statement 1 for a~l its 
boldne ss, did not succeed in curt aili ng American relations 
with China. 
On December 19, 1934, Japan gave notice that it 
intended to end participation in the naval li mitations 
' ·---
40Hull., I, 279. 
41Bisson, American · Pqlicy in . the F~r East, p . 31. 
42Grisrold, p. 444 . 
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treaties of 1921-192 2. Those entrusted 1ith the for-
mul ation of American policy in the Far East were once again 
at the cro ssroad s o.f decision. As Secret~ry Hul l saw it, 
there were two poss ible courses of action which the United 
States dght follO,rf. One was to ·withdraw gradually, nper-
haps with di gnity,n from the Far Eas t. This would mean , 
Hull believed, ac quies cence in the nullification of Americ an 
tre aty rights, the closin g of the Open Door, the aoandon-
ment of China to the ac quisitive designs oi Japan, relin-
caishment of the ri ght to prote ct Am rican nationals in 
China, and the surrenderin g of American commercia l rights 
on the Asian mainland . It would, in effect .t turn over the 
entire Pacific area west of Hawaii to the domination of 
Japan.4-3 The oth er course of action was to continue to 
insist on the maintenance of law, the faithful obs erva nce 
of China's t erritoria l and adminis tr ative integrity, and 
upon the rights and interests of A eric ans in the Fai-· East . 
To pursue the latt ..,r course .eant na firm, though not 
a,P-gr€ssi ve ,n policy toward Japan. 44 
As a nati on attempting to uphold th e doctrine of 
world order .under law, both Hull and Presiden t Roosevelt 
felt that t hey could do no other than choose the second 
eourse • The ost i mmediate reason for this d-ecision to 
continue Ameri ca's traditional policy in East Asia was the 
deep-seated c n cer n for the security of America.,;i territorial 
possessions i.n the \>"Jestern Pacific . The Philippine 
Islands, long recognized as t he United States ' 0 Achilles 
hee l'' in the Far East, was still very much Japan's hos-
tage .4-5 
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Durin ~ th e next several years after the conquest of 
Manchuria , a new phase of Ja panese economic and po litical 
penetrati.on opened in North China . The technique of mass 
smugglin g was employed in a cons ci ous effort t o undermin e 
both Chinese and Western interests in that region. Thes e 
smugglin g operations seriously affected the position of all 
the Western ewers in th e ir trade relations 1.·Jith China. In 
1935, it was esti mated by the Bank of China that illega l 
entry of Japanese goods reached a tota l value of about 
"'63 , 000 , 000 . If Ja pan ' s le gal exports to China in 1935 ar e 
added to t his f igure , the total value of Japanese goods 
sold to China for that year can be placed at over 
100 , 000 . 000 . By contrast, Unit ed States exports declined 
from ~:i69,0 00,0O0 in 1934 to ~~38 , 000 ,0 00 in 1935.4-6 Both 
the United States and Great Britain prot ested against 
Ja pan's e f forts "to brin g about a substantial chang e in the 
political s tatus and condi tions in several of China' s 
nor"!:her~ pr ovinces . »47 Such protests, hm'-lever , were 
complet el y ineffe ctive . 
45Griswold, pp . 449- 50. 
46Bisson , Forei gn Policy Reoorts, XII (August 1 , 
1936) • 131. 
4 7I bid . , p . 129. 
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Sino-:-American Economic Relations 
on th e Eve of War 
39 
On the eve of Ja pan' s m1.l itary assault upon China 
pr oper, American invest ment s in China were estim·ted at a 
maximum of ~.200,000,0 00 . The9e in.vestments re mai ned predom-
inately business hol ding s in pro pert ies owned and operated 
by American national s . Nothing had happened to make 
Chines e cor poration s more attractive to American capital. 
Si milarly , Americ an investments in Chinese Government obli -
ati on s co ntinu ed t o be small and not very ~mccessful. In 
1936 , the only Ameri can issue of Chinese Govern ment sec ur--
itie .s was t he one- f ourth shar e of th e Hukuan g ailway bonds 
of 19 11. It wi ll be recalled th ,Jt the pa rtici pation of 
American bankers in this pr oject was secured only aft er 
Pr eside nt 'I'aft made a drama.tic appea l to the Chinese Regent 
requesting th at American ca pit al be allo wed equal partici-
pati on with Brit is h , French, and German funds .~ Of the 
ori ginal cf l,500 ,0 00 alloted to the United States , 
£ 1,402,0 00 were still outstanding i n 1936 , with i nterest 
payments in arrears by£402 , ~10.4 8 The dire ct return 
en joy ed by ·Americans from such invest ments re mained a uneg .. 
ligi ble it em" even in t he Great Depression year of 1935.49 
By 1936 , the pre dictio ns of a vas t China trade were 
still to be re a.lized. The Prowth whi ch had occurred in the 
Far Easte rn t rad e must b@ attri but ed, not to Chi na , but 
pr i marily to other countries ; the Phi li ppines, British 
48Lockwood, Far East ern Surve;y , V (Augus t 12, 1936), 
49Ibid., p. 183. 
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Malaya, the Netherl and s Indies, an d above all , Japan . In 
1936, Japan acc ounted for no less than 43 per cent of all 
American trade with t he Far East .50 In 1936, the value of 
American exports to Ja pan was ~204,300,000, whi le China 
accounted f or only $55, 400,000 of America's exports. Of 
imports from the two countries, the United States received 
from J apan commodities YOrth $171,0 00 ;000. Americ a's 
ag re ga t .e imports from China wer e valued at ~t82, 800 ,000. 
In brief, Japan was the Unitecl States' third best customer 
in 1936, whi l e the United State s was Japan's best custo mer. 
Chi na ranked well below Japan in each ca pa city.51 
~hile the dollar value of America's trade with 
China ha d grown t hro ugh the years, its re ·lative i mportance 
revealed little change: from 2,7 per cent of imports and 
2.3 per cent of exports in 1901-1 905, to 3.2 per cent of 
i mports and 3.7 per cent of exports in 1931-1935, hlith only 
minor fluctuations along the way. 52 Despite a policy of 
ho stility to Ja )an from the first years of the t wentieth 
century, American tra de ith Ja pan had doubled and some~ 
ti mes tri ple d that wit h China .53 
Among the ite ms whi ch loomed l arg e in America's 
exports to t he Far East dur i ng the mid-'thirties ere 
cotton, toba cco, and petrole um products. Cotton repres en-
ted rnore t han one-third of th e value of all American 
50Farley , Far Eastern Survey, V ( July 29, 1936) , 163. 
51Griswold, p . 468 . 
52Farley, Far Eas tern Survey, V {July 29, 1936), 163. 
53Gri swold, p . 46$. 
exports to •~ast Asia . Constituti ng more than half of all 
ex ports to Ja pan, t hG cotton trade was of th e most vital 
concern to the Southern stat es. China's share of this 
trade, never lar ge , declined during the early 'thirties, 
while that of Ja pan increa sed.54 
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MorH than half of the United States' flue-cured . 
tobacco was exported in the 192$-19 29 season, and more than 
one-third of this amount v as exported to t,he Far ltast, 
mainly to China. and Japan. '.rhe growth of the Chinese c iga-
rette industry caused ex ports to fa.11 off drastically in 
1935 , It, •.-1as chiefly the decline of the Chinese market 
whi c h was res ponsible for the f act that exports of flu e-
cured tobacco to Ea st Asia re presented only about 7 per 
cent of domestic production in 1934-1935, as compared with 
i9 per cent i n 1928 - 1929 . A h i gh t ariff prev ented Japan 
fro 1 bei ng a l ar ge consu mer of American leaf tobacco.55 
The major industrial group 1.1ith a considerable 
stake in the Far Ea.st in 1935 was the petroleum industry. 
Although oil was the most important non-a gricultural item 
sold to Asia , exports to the Far East re pre$ 0 nted no more 
t,han about 2 per cent of domestic production of refined 
products. China too a lar ge percentage of the United 
States' ex ports of kerosene while Japants gro win g f uel 
requirements made her an j_:ncr easingly i mportant customer 
for crude petroleum, gasoline, gas oil, and fuel 011.56 
54Farley, Far Eastern. Survey, V (July 29, 1936}, 
166-67. 
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Throu ghout the early 'thirti~s, however, a 
fundamental chan ge in the cha racter of America's t·rade with 
China . wa~ perceptible . rrhrou ghout this period there was a 
gro wi ng tr .end on the part of China away fro m t h e impor-
t ation of agricultural co odities and to ward an increased 
demand for manuf actured oods . 57 This shift in empha sis 
resulted in part from tee . olo gical advauces in Chi~ese 
agriculture . By instituti ng a pol icy o.f' a ri cul tur a l 
protectionism, Ch i.na was able to lir 1 it i npor-t ations of 
American -cotton, wheat, wheat · lour, an d tobacco, and to 
re place t hem with domestic output. The four agricultural 
products l'lhich constituted the bulk of China's imports from 
the Unite States i n 1932 had shrunk to less than 20 per 
cent of the total in 1935, and in 1936> to less than 15 per 
cent of all i mports from Ameri c .5 
\ hil e Chinese import ti ons of Americ n oods dimin-
ished betw een 1932 and 1935; Chinese exports to th e United 
Stat es steadily increased fro m 1932 to 1937 . This increase 
was lar gely t he resu lt of the Unit ed Sta.tes' growin:,, par-
ticl pation in the eX't,ort trade of Szechwan Province . In 
~ ' · 
1936, about one - t hird of American imports fro~ China 
consisted of wood oil and goat skins. both of which ca me 
pri marily from t h is area of western China.59 
Vastly more important than the changes wh ich took 
57Kurt Bloch, "'Chinese-American ,sc-onomic .. el ation s 
and the 'lar,° Far •astern Survey, VIII (J anuary 19, 1....-39), 
P • 13. 
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place in the Sino-American trade wer e the econo mic re sults 
of a silver purchase policy inau gurated by the United 
States Government in 1933. This po li cy re sto re d ttvirtual l y 
unli mited market ab ility 1' to silver• 60 In ~1e.y of 1936, the 
Republic of China and t he United States con cluded an agree-
ment whi ch provided for the purchase by th e United States 
of lar ge amounts of silver from the Central Bank of China . 
In 1937 and again in 1938, the sco pe of t he ori gina l 
arran gement "'ras extended and .broade ned •. 61 Thes e agr eements 
were to have the gre ates t polit ical as well as economic 
si gnificance . With the esta blish ment of dollar exc hang e, 
the gre atest obstacle to Chin ese currency reform was 
removed . Under the provisions of t h e Silver Purc has e Act 
of 1934, China was at last ab l e to se ll he r pre vi ously 
unmarketable hoard of silver , thereby exchanging j_t, for a 
war chest of liruid resources totalin g more than 
400,000 , 000 , a sum of' importance bot h absol ut ely an d in 
compar ison to the resources available to Ja pa n. 62 
60ibid . , pp . 15- 16. 61Jo hnston e, pp . 1$8- 89, 
62Bloch, Far Eastern Survey, VIII {January 19 , 
1939), 17. 
CHAPT III 
lfHE SI ro-JAP JtNE,'E v1AR, 1937-1938: THE CH.11.LLENGE 
TO A~iERICAN INT EST IN CI INA 
Japan Invades Ch:Lna, 19)7 
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On July 7; 1937, Japanese forces launched the 
second all-otlt attack upon China. The i mmediate cau.se for 
this direct assault upon the mainl nrl grew out o:t a nli:nor 
in cident near Peiping, provoked and enlar ged upon by t.he 
Imperial Japanese force$ stationed in the area$ The 
Japanese army had once again chosen th~ ti me and the plac e 
for the att ck, much as it had in Manehuria only . . six year s 
e.fore . Th is n€W aggression on the As;i.an continent > moi"'e ... 
overt w s a. n tural conse quence of th.:> fixed policy of 
ex ansionism upon .. hich the army had been bent since 192$. 
Unlike the totterin g moderate gover nment of Prime 4inister 
Tanaka in 1932, however, the Ja panese Govern m.ent i n 19.37 
ma e no real effort to limit the f :ghtin ,, Quite to the 
contrary , Pr:;tme Minister Konoye revea l ed to the Diet sev~ 
eral weeks fter the beginning of hostilities that the 
Jap · nese Government intended to mold a "new order" in Ea.st 
1: 13ia. Thus, lt.ho ugh the July aggression had been provoked 
by the Army, it was not now out. o.f consonant with th e gov-
er1iment' s avowed obj ective of . redu cing China to a st ate of 
vassala e.1 
Conditions existi ng in Japan had played a large 
part in the evolution of the expansionistic policy which 
had entered its second st age with the July 7 attack near 
Petping. The home islands ha.d been feeling the pressures 
of a burgeoning population. All usable land was already 
under cultivation. Anxious attempts were. unden.ra.y te 
exp nd both old and net'li industries, b:ut capital resources 
were l'imited and ra w mat erials from foreig:n la.i."lds were 
es s~n tial if pro gre ss was to be made in th _is quarter. In 
spite of such serious li. mit&tions, the nation had been 
determined to hav e a milita ry and n:lval force equ al t -o 
t ho.s of · the more affluent powers. In short, Ja.~an' s re-
sources and h$r ambitlons had be-en so.dly out of balanee,2 
Ja pan .' s already precarious pos ition had be -en further 
jeopard:i .zed in the mid-' thirtie~ by t he i mpact of a 
catastrophic and world - wide depr~ssion.. Many foreign 
na tions had raised import barriers as , a measu :re to fig-h t 
the j_nternal effects of' gene ral economic -collapse, making 
it increasingly more diff icult for Japan to S-""ll its 
pro ctuets abroad. The nation till pos s es sed .ample gold 
r eserve s, but if t his sup ly were to be nraine d off by~ 
pro lo nged perio d of unfavorable balance of t:rade, Japan 
would be f'orced to dr op back to _ a poor@r standard o.f 
1Balla.n ti n e, For ei gll Affairs, XXVII (July, 1949 ), 654. 
2Herbert Feis he Road to Pearl Harbor ( Pri nceton: 
Pri nc eton Unj_versity Press, 1950 , -p . 3 ~ 
living, and her st ature as a nation among nation s would 
inevitably di minish . Rather than f'ac e this tL"1pleas ant 
prospect , the Army and the "excitedly p triotic 0 had 
preferred another solution: the territorial eA-tension of 
the Japanese Empire ._3 
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Conditions abroad in 1937 made it seem not only 
possible but urgent for Japan to act deoisively . In China, 
the spirit of nationalism was gaining momentum , threatening 
not only Japan's activities in that country where more than 
90 per cent of its foreign invest;ments t--:ere located _, 4 but 
also endan gering Japan's control over Korea and , nchoukuo •. 
Many alarmed Japanese observers believed th •t if this surge 
of Chinese nationalism 1ere to go unchecked, the resu l t 
would be the ultimate expulsion ,of all Japanese interests 
from China .. The opini.on soon forme d, especia l ly in t h e 
army , that Japan must a.ke its will flt quickl y and force-
fully on the China mainland . 5 
An analysis of the situation .in Europe seemed to 
offer further support for the bold course of aetion which 
the firebrands advocated. France and England , the two 
great foreign landholders in Asia ., were held in balan ce by 
Germany and I taly . The United States, for its part , had so 
badly neglected its rmy and navy that it was incapable of 
3Ibid _. 
4nwha.t' s Our Stake in Chi na , n Business :·eek, August 
7 , 1937, p . 15. 
5F . . ,. eis, p . ~• 
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undertal,.ing a war i n the western Pa.cific. In addi t:i.ont the 
American people, - dee ply involved in ~omest.ic pro blems , 
-muld not > it i,ro.s Judged, 
. ., 
o to war to rescue Chin or to 
protect European colonies.6 The future for Japanese ar,s 
in Cina appeared bri ht indeed. 
1fhece ex pectations ·were re -lized to a large degree • 
In the last half of 1937, Imperial a . if;S pe ne·trated deep 
into China . To eonsoli~ ate their ga i ns , the Ja panese 
est ab lis h ed puppet regimes t rough which fl'okyo co uld ex-
ercise control over the conquered territories. On December 
14-, 1937, the Peking Provisional Gover nment was formed in 
·. eking fo:r. operat,ion in the five North Ch:Lna provinces under 
J ~anese dominat ion. Four months l ter, on 'larch 28, 193$, 
the Reformed Government of Mankin g was established unde r 
Japanese s onsorshi_ to ad minister afre.irs in the re gion of 
the lo rnr Yangtze Valley. As prin ci pa l cities were con-
quered, local syste ms of govern ment were established, such 
as the Ta tao or · nqreat faytt Govern en.t in the area of 
Shanghai.? 
Through these admi n i stra tive ~ge _ci.es , Japa nese 
authorities began to i stitute the "new order" whi ch had 
as its objective t e creation of a regional econo my th~t 
would reduce Japan's dependence upon the outside ,-,mrld . In 
this scheme of things, t he role of the Chinese nation :1as 
obvious: it was to be a market forte manufactur ed go ods 
of Japan and a primary source of the r aw materj_ : J.s whi ch 
_,_. ____________ ________ _ 
would make those same manufactur e:s pos sib le . Furthe rmore, 
cheap Chi nes e labor , ould be us ed to car ry f on r rd certain 
export industrie~ , most p ticularly te xti les, Ja pan' s 
largest si ngle expor t co nilllo <i ty . 8 
Japan 1 s Policy of Commercial Exclusion 
in China 
As soon as the J ananese had restored a de ree of 
order in those areas under their occupation, mea sur es wer e 
initiated by the pup et govern1ents wLich wer e desi gned to 
ensu re Japan' s economi c contro l over the subjugated ar9 s.9 
It was soon m de abundan tly cle ar th at the pr es.ence of 
other forei gn interests ~.as not compatible with Ja pant s 
econo i c objective s in Chin • The easL1re s institute d und er 
the direc t ion of Ja an se officials wer e detr i menta l to all 
but Ja anese co· erce . A erican s and me bers of ot her fo r-
ei gn commerci al communities f ound themselves saddled with 
t rav el and transportat io n restriction s, i mpeded by di sc rim-
inatory re 0 ul ations i n the use of port fa cilities, hampered 
by c ns ors hip of corre pondence, cr amped by i rn ort and ex-
port restrictions, and subjected to certain tariffs from 
which Japanes e merchants w e exempt .IO orei gn shi ppers 
w re not permitte d to use the r ai l ways •Jit out the 
8Bisso n , American Polic y in _ th _e Far East , p . 96 . 
9Johnstone , P • 143. 
10Jo hn R. Stewart, nThe 1ar nd Wes tern I nt erests in 
N rth China , n Far Eastern .._urvey. VII (Octo ber 12 , 1938) , 
P• 231 . . . 
49 
assistan ce-- at a pr ice--of Japanese forwarding companies. 
Closure of the lower and ~,1id tle Yangtze Rive r to all but 
Japanese shipping gave to Japanese companies a l ucr at ive 
monopoly of passen ger nd frei .ht service on the most 
tr aveled sect ions of t he riv er . 11 \\16 stern bu sin ess men wer e 
often denied the right of access to their pro perty and 
warehouse s long after hostilities had ceas ed . 12 Such was 
the gamut the foreign commercial agent was for ced to run if 
he wish ed to continue busine ss oper ati ons in occu pied 
China . 
The establish uent of a Ja pan -China- Manchouku o 
econo mi c bl oc under the di rection of the Ja panese author -
ities was an other instru ment of discri mination used against 
the Western businessman . In Iarc h t 1938, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of China was established on t he bas i s of yen 
cre dits extended by the Yokohama Specie Bank . The new 
North China yuan cur ren cy which was sub s equently issued was 
in convertible into any foreign currency and was link ed to 
the Ja pa nese yen and the "la.nchouku oa n yuan in a ti ght yen 
blo c. The net result was the immobilization of a cons id-
erable amount o:f t estern trade and invest ments i n North 
China , and the si multaneo us sti mulation of Ja panese com-
merce.13 
11
~uigley , p . 129. 
12navid H. Popper , " Progres s of the Sino-Ja panese 
Conf lict , n Forei gn Policy Repo rts, XIV ( 1ay 15, 1938), 60 . 
13st ew.art, Far Easte rn S'1rvey, VII (October 12, 
193 8 ) , 2J l. 
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The 1ort h China Develo pment Company and t he Central 
China Pro motion Company, or ganized in May and Ju ne, res pec-
tively, of 1938, represented furth er attemp ts by Tokyo to 
f orce f ro m t he f ield all oth er foreign competition of any 
COfl;sequ ence . Both or ga nizations ·were, i n fact , agen cies of 
the Ja anese Government , established to monopolize every 
f orm of l ar ge-scale business enter prise .1 4 The se t1• o l ar ge 
holdi ng companies and their subsidiaries cornere d the pri n-
ci pal heavy i ndustries and utilities in the areas unde r 
Ja pan ese control. Throu gh their operation, the Japane .se 
pre ... empted t he whole field of industrial dev elo pment in 
China for themselves . Economic control of occu pied Chi na 
soo n rested al most exclusi ve ly with Ja pan .15 
One of the most drastic develo pments af fe cti ng not 
only foreign ri ghts and interests but t he very sovereignty 
of China aros e f ro m th e purcha se of Chinese real estate by 
Ja panese nationals . Since the earlie st day s of Chin a's 
contact with th e \fa st• a lien landownership had been 
severely restri cted. Even duri ng the most aggressiv e days 
of Western economic i mper i al is m, Chi nes e au t horities had 
su cce eded in li miti ng al ien l and owners h i p to the i mmediat e 
vi ci nity of the treat y ports and concessions. 
Under Japanese military pres s re, however, Chinese 
la ndowners were compell ed to sell pro pe rty i ndisc r i minately . 
14Qui gl ey, p. 125~ 
l5 s tewart, Far East ern Survez, VII (Octo be r 12, 
193S), 234, 
This new infringement--especially since citiz&ns of other 
eountries were excluded from the same privi le ge -•furt her 
buttressed the preferen tial e,con0.rnic position Japan was 
carvi ng out for itself in China.16 . 
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To the American businessman resident in China, the 
economic measur es whi ch were taken by Japan in those areas 
under its control seemed reminiscent of what had occurred 
after the creation of fanchouku o in 1932. In the years 
whieh immediately followed the formation of that puppet 
state, Japanese monopolies, with the aid of Japanese cap-
ital, had almost entirely eli minat ed American business north 
of the Great Wall. It was obvious that the same methods 
were now being a pli ed in China with the same disastrous 
results almost certain to overtake American commeroe,17 
Effects of the War on Sino-American Trade 
By August of 1937 the fighting had engulf~d 
Shanghai , aralyzing China's mQst important seaport and 
industrial center, and the s te of 65 per cent of all 
Amerlca.n business investments in China,18 The Shanghai 
Power Company and the Shanghai Telephone Company alone were 
l6Kurt Blo ch, "Alien Landownership Versus Open Door 
in China ," Far Eastern Sur vey, VII {August 24, 19381, 
198-99. . . 
York: 
17Bisson, American PoliC;( in th.e Far East, P• 96 •. 
18c. F. Remer , Forei~n Investments in China (New 
The Macmillan Co., 19 3 J • p . 282. 
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@ 19 valued at over ~?40,000,000. In the course of th e 
fighting around the great intern t,iona l city, the property 
of the Shanghai Power Company escaped serious harm , but the 
Shanghai Telephone Company sustained damage in excess of 
sever al hundred thousand dollars. 20 While an accurate es-
timate of uro perty damage was impossible, of fi cials and 
businessmen pla ced the injury done to American holdings in 
the lower Yangtze Val ley alone at , 25,0 00 ,000. 21 
Chinese-American trade relations 1 ere dealt a stun-
ning blo w by the hostilities of 1937-38. China's foreign 
trade had been in a flourishing condition i1 the years 
i ediately prior to the renewal of hostilities. In t he 
first six months of 1937, with l a,;-: and order extended over 
a lar ger area of China than at any time since 1911, 22 the 
Chinese Republi c had just begun to import consi derab le 
amounts of ca ital goods in the pros pe ct of undertaking an 
extensive program of industrial development.23 The United 
States had sha.recl. in this increase in China's import and 
export tr ad e. ~ith much of Americats industrial capa cit y 
gathering dust under the impact of a severe econ omic 
19nwhat's Our Stake in China, 0 Business Week, 
August 7 , 1937, p . 14. 
20J ohnstone, p . 190. 
21rrhis sum includes damage to all American property , 
both oommercial and non~ commercial. 
22 Joh nston e, p. 165. 
23Bisson, American Policy in the Far Eas t, p. 95. 
depression,. many opti miB"tie head s had once :•gain begun to 
drea1a of the vast bene .fits that eould be rea ped f ro m a 
China undergoing modernization. 
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The resu..rnption of th tt Sino-iJa panese oonf1.ict,, how.-
ever, had dashed t h is p:t"'ospe ct"' Th0 announc ement by the 
Ja panese in l ate August,, 1937 ,. of a blockade along the 
Chinese · eoast, and the bombing of Ch ine .• s li mi,ted int;ernal 
communications netiwork severely disru ptEr:d c.11 fore .ign 
tr ade • .As a result of the unfavorable conditions created 
by the war, the value of American exports to China dropped 
pr ec·:Lpitously from ·6,0$1,000 in August, 1937, t.o 
$1, :559,000 in the fol lo vling month of September, . wit h o:aJ.y a 
slight recov ery by the end of the year . 24 The first halt 
of the year , however, had seen such vigorous tr -de 
rel at i on s between th~ tjWO count ries that the total v·alu e o.t 
Amer·ic an ex ports to China in 1937 ( j 49 ,697, .ooo} exceeded 
that for 19,36 ( $46 ,, gl9' 1,000). Tracin g trade returns from 
July of 1937 reveals a steady dec].ine through t hfS following 
twelve months of 1938~ Again comparing figure s on a year ly 
bas is, American exp o:rts to China de clined to :J4, , 719,000 in 
1936, a drop of nearly $15,000~0 00 from the pr~vious 
yeaF .2 5 
In t erms ot speci.f'i,c comi.11odities, the great 
24-Paul B. 'l'ay lor, 'Amer ica's Role in the Far 
Eastern Conflict," For.eign Pol icy: llepor,ts, XIII (February 
15, 19.38) t p . 282 • . 
25Johnstone, P• 168-69 . 
51+ 
re duction in China's in ustrial ac tivity after the begin-
ning of hosti l ities ·w·as re f lecte d in the sharp de crea s e i.n 
exports of American textiles, petroleum pro ducts , lu mber-, 
and ir on and steel products to the Chi nese Republ i c. 26 The 
small trader who dea l t in the se commoditi es v-as pa rticularly 
in jured by the resu mption of 'the war in 193 7. 27 Only thos e 
who pa rtici ated in ex ports of war materi a.ls to inde pendent 
China found the years 1937 and 1938 dis tinctly pro f ita ble . 
China's ex ports tot.he Uni ted St tes fell even mor e 
shar ply," spiralin g downward fro m a total of' ,,103 , 616,000 in 
1937 to t he considerably di mini sh ed sum of J 47 , 189 , 000 in 
193$ . 28 The hea': iest reductio ns were noted in i mports from 
North China , an are a of major Ja pane se military a ctiY i ty . 
Tung oil , the most important Ch ines e ra v1 material pur chased 
by the United St ate s , coul d be su ppli ed in 1938 to only 
abou t half t he quantity and va lue of 1937 . 29 
Reactio n of th e American Busines s Community 
t o Japan~se Agg ression 
The ext ensive dislocation whi ch the Sino - Ja panes e 
war visited upon Chinese-A mert can trade and the unmistak ... 
able efforts of Japan e se aut horities to force out all f or -
ei gn commerce f ro m t hose areas under its control did not 
fail, to ga lvanize the Ameri can commer cial community i n 
26Bloch , Far Eas ter n Surveyt V'.I:II (J anuary 19 , 
1939) , 17 . 
1939), 
27 Jo hns tone , p • 180 . 28I bid. , pp . 168 - 69 . 
29Bloch , Far Eastern Survey 1 VII I (January 19, 
17. 
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China into a ction. Commercial groups entertatned no notion 
of with ra win g fr om China , as isola .tionist ele ments in the 
United Sta tes ur ged. Quite to th ·e contrrry, they were 
determin d to 1nak e every ef' ort to hold on, and they were 
persist •ent in their demands for the .full protection of the 
United State s Government .3 0 By the end of 1937, there was 
a far greater degree of unani mity of attitude among members 
of both business and non-business groups than at any pre-
vious time .31 
When Man churia was overrun in 1931 , Americ an bus -
iness age nts in China had hesit ated. in the ir opposition to 
Japan . 'I'hey ha d not envisioned Japanese aggression as a 
dire ct threat to their own rights and interests . By 1937, 
howeve r, Japan's objectives had become cl ear , and Ameri can 
commer cial groups '\',1e:re thoro ug hly al -rmed by the pros pect 
of Japanese heg emony over the whole of China. 'lith Ja pan's 
military assault upon China proper, Americans in China 
al most without exce ption condemned ·111okyo ts policy of 
expansion and voiced support for the Nationalist Govern-
ment . 32 
Americans resident in China wef~ '' quite concerned by 
the inaction and indecision which they beli eved to char-
act erize ~ashington 's offi ci al position wit h regard to the 
Far East . They roundly denoun ce d the "professional 
.30r,1asland , The Pacifi c Hist or ic al Revi ew, XI 
(September, 1942), 293. · 
31Johnstone, p. 215. 
32Masland , The Pa ci fi c Histo r i cal Review, XI 
(September , 1942), 295. 
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pacifists" and the "Ja panese prota gonists" who were so 
anxious to "le ve the fie ld to the Japanesen that t hey 
called or the imruedi a.te 1ithdr wal of all Americ ns from 
China.33 The very fact that such outr a eous demands 
enjoyed a wide audience in the United States--even among 
cert ain "hysterical" officials in Washington--made it clear 
that the American people at home rnr e "uninformed" and the 
Administration "confused." The American peopl e in the 
Unit ed States, it was felt, would be brought to their sen-
ses only if Americans in China took the le ad in i ndica'Cing 
what should be one.34 
Americ an bus iness interests did not shri nk fro m the 
task of ma.king the United tates public an i nf or med public. 
Th-e American busin ess community in China was well or ganized 
and able to secure ide expression of its views in the 
United States . The American Chamers of Commerce iere the 
most active or gan iza t ions, ending frequent cables directly 
to the State Department, the White House, and to various 
Con ,ressional committees. The Americ n Chruber of Commerce 
in Shanghai acted as a cle aring house for iv~ sister or-
ganiz at ions in Tientsin• Hankow, and Canton.35 Indic ations 
of business opinion in China were ·usually well reported in 
th e American press. The Shangha i and Tientsin Chambers of 
Commerce and the Shanghai American Junior Chamber of 
33The Ch ina -1~ekly Review, September 11, 1937, p . 19. 
3¼he China Weekly Revie w, October 2, 1937, p . 66. 
35Joh ns to ne, p . 218 . 
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Commerce r egularly communicated. t heir att i tud es to t he 
United St ;.ltes Chamber o:f Commerce. 1any of t he~;e communt-
ques were , in turn , transmitted directl y to Government of-
f:Lcia1.s nd to the press.36 
Shor tly after the out bre ak of hostil iti es in 1937, 
busi ne ssmen and ot,he r residents of the Americ an communit y 
at Shanghai or gan ized th e Americ~n Association , a body 
established to coor dina t e the pro ~r ams and a cti vi ti es of 
Americ ans in tha .t ci ty ,,.37 Its pri mary object:i;v~ was to 
pro mote t he saf ety of Amer ican life . and proper ty in 
Shan ghai, and wherever els e possi ble in Ghina . 3$ This 
committee frequently protested to Washin gto n aga i n ... t
Ja panese beh avior, es pec ially in case s where perso na l or 
pro pe rt y ri ghts were viol at ed.39 
Worki ng closel y .with the Americ an Associ ~t i on was 
th e Ameri can I nfo r mat i on Gom.inittee , .formed :i.n Octobe r of 
19) $ . 40 The I nf or mation Comtnitt ·e.e oft en i ssued join t 
st atements ~'ith th e Americ an Cham er of Commerc e in 
Shangha i . Its most i mport ant work , ho 1cver, was the pub~ 
li catio n of a series of bookl ets f or distribution in the 
United St ates, by means of ~ .. b io h it ho ped to in fo r m th e 
Americ an public of preci se ly what was happening in the Far 
Ea st . 4l 1.'hese pamph lets co nsistently expressed supp ort f or 
36Masland , The Pacific Hi. tori cal Review , XI 
(Se pte mber, 1942), 296 . 
37 1b··1· d ., ·- 38J h t - 219 • _. 0 ns on .e, p . • 
39Masland , The Pacific Historical Revie w, XI 
(Sept ember, 1942) , 296. 
40 I bid. 41 J op nsto n e, pp. 221 - 23. 
the Chin ese and advocated a stron ge r United Stat es policy 
to war d Ja pan . 
All these grou ps were bitterly aroused b y the 
dis eriminatory commerci al policies whieh the Japanese 
initi ted in North (,hina and the Yangtze val ley region. 
during 1937 ... 193$, They a' iJ1aude ·d the United 0tates Govern ... 
m~mt when it spoke firmly to Japan in defonse of Ameri can 
ri hts in China • and call ed for a stiffening of Ame~ican 
pol i cy when t:ashington appeared to va.scilate , 42 But at all 
ti fles a stead y stream of i ntelligence f lo wed .from China t o 
the Unit ed Stat ,es, informin g the Ameri can pub lic and the 
United States Government of J pan's l ate.st efforts to el i m-
i nate all Americ an commerce from Ghina.43 
Raaetion of t he United States Government 
to Japanese Aggression 
Uit ~1 the renewal of the co nf lict i n China , the 
American Government was again faced ·'ilith the tho--rny problem 
of _determining 11hnt course of a ction the United States 
should follow in the F.ar East . There were three main , di -
vergent lines of _ olicy whic h could be pursued; ( l) all 
pos si bility of conflict with the bell i g,,.rents could be 
avoided by eclaring the eutr ality Act of 1937 to be in 
ef'fact, accompanied by the withdrawal of Americ an citizens 
42nAmerican Chamber at Tientsin Warns U,. St 
Businessmen , n Export Trade an d ShinpeI", I. · V'III ( Dece mber 
5, 19) $) J $. __, . . . 
43stewart , far Eas tern .sur'v,~x, VII (Octo ber 12, 
193$ }, 2JO. 
and troo ps fr om danger zones; (2) the Unit ed States could 
parti cipat e in vari ous collective measures designed to 
sup press war; (3) the United States cou.ld undert ake th e 
rotection of Ameri can ri ;·h ts an d intere..,ts abroad on a 
strictly unilateral bas is. 
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The fi r st pos s ibi ity, althou gh enjoying consid-
era bl e su ort in the United States- -and es pecially favored 
by the isol ationist and pe ce blocs--did not find favor 
wi th the ad inistration. If this purel y isolationist 
course were followed ,. Japan ·· ght be encouraged to press 
f or wa.rd the more r ap idl y , convin ced that there was nothing 
to be fea re from th e United Sta tes. 
While fervently desiring to discoura ge aggression, 
1 ashington did not f eel free to ,join in any collective 
action against the ag ressor. The Lea gue of Nations, with 
whic h the United States had cooper ated duri ng the investi--
ga tion of the r. ttnchu rian incident in . 1932, was by 1937 a 
mo~ibund or ganization that ·commanded no respect from 
l awle ss nations. Great Britai n an d Fran cei confronted with 
a ra pidly rearming Germany and an obstrepero ,us Italy, were 
.deeply embroiJ.ed in t he gro win g tensions of Europe. In the 
United Sta:tes itself, further more ., the isol at ionist spiri t 
' 
was at f lood tide, makin g American part ici pa ti on in any 
collective a c ion against a foreign power virtua ll y 
impos 0 ible .44 
Thus confronted with the dile mma of searchin g for 
44Taylor , Foreign Policy Reports, XIII (February 
15, 1938), 278-79. 
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effect ive ays of cau sin g Japan to dei st while sta ying un~ 
i nvolved,45 t he ,oose vel t ~dministration resorted to the 
tr ad iti onal polic y of i nsisting upon pro per res pect f or 
American ri ght s and intere ts in China . This was , :in 
effe ct, a compromise polic y betw een t he compl ete abandonnen t 
of American interests and activit ies on the China mainl and, 
and active interventi on to protect th em,. 
On July 16, 1937 , Secret ary of State Hull issued ·a 
forma l press release in whic h he repeated the prineiples 
which he had ext olled since his entrance into office. He 
called upon all nati ons to faithful l y observe i nt ernatio nal 
agreement s and to upho l d the principle of th e san ctity of 
t rea ties. Pit hou t special re feren ce t o ei th<~r China or 
Ja pan , he declar'ed that the United States sought Hef.fec-
tive equality of com.mercial opportunity; n and urg ed upon 
all nat i ons th e «ap plicrtion of the princi pl e of equality 
of treatment. n46 
Thi s rvas diplomacy by orality, a. fl ic k<.~rin ca ndle 
in a naughty world . "In pur e ri ....,hteou sncs s it outdid the 
Stimson polic y of 1932.n47 It expressed an attitud e rather 
45F ·· 10 
. e1.s, p. • 
46u. s. Department of State, faee rs Kel ating to the 
Forei gn Rel at ions of the Unite d St ates: Ja pan I' 1-1 1 f 
Washin gto n : United States uover nment Pr i nting Offi ce, 
1943), 326. (Cited hereafte r a s Forei gn Relations: Japan, 
1931-1941.) 
4 7nonald F . Dru.romond, The Pa ssi ng of' American 
Neutr;ality, 1937-1941 · {Ann Arbor: 'lqhe University of 
) ic i gan Press, 1955}, p ,. 53~ 
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than a policy, Its severe limitations were all too 
apparent . But existing conditions, both foreign and domes ... 
tict. re imented aga inst any firmer expression of national 
policy at that ti me. 1.f th~ United States could not move 
forward _, at lea ... t it could decline to withdraw , and t h e 
re assertion of the Open Door and :tts attendant tre aty 
rights seeme d. the one way in ·which the a:dmini st ration could 
of f-er resistance to Japanese expa nsion~sm in the Far Eas t.4 8 
One of the foremost concerns of the United States 
Government after the resu mption cf hostilities was the 
presen ce of some 12,0 00 Americans in China , Many of thes e 
persons were in areas w,ieh were unde r attack, Both the 
President and his cabinet feared the re,Percussions whi ch 
mi ght result if Americ an lives ·were lost., 'l'he outbreak of 
serious fig hting around Shanghai in the f 11 of 1937 made 
the pr oblem of adequate protection acute.49 
To sa.fequard these Americans, Washingt .on acted with 
consi derabl e dispa tc h . Dip lo matic and consular of f icials 
were ordered to u,r ge citi zens of the United Stat.es 'to le(;lVe 
t he danger zorn:~s as qui ckly as possi blet and where possible 
to ass ist in this evacuation~ To fae:i.litat~ t his proces s 
of removal, Se·c:ret,ary Hull sked Congress on August 17, 
1937 to a ppro priate ~-500,0 00. At t.he same tt me, the '""Overn-
ment ordered that li200 marine s loc ated at San Die go be 
sent to Shan gh ai in order ~o g ive more adequat e pr otection 
to t ho se Americans remai ning in the area of thoaa prepa ring 
48Ibid . 
· 49Taylor, Foreign Policy Rep~rts J i!II (February 
15 , 19 3 8 ) , 2 83 • 
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·to de part.50 Inf antry and mar ine detachments stationed at 
eipin g and Ti entsi.n were ke pt on active du ty , ns were the 
nine river gunboats cruisiri g in Chinese waters . 51 Admiral 
Yarnell , co m.ma_nder of t h 0 United St ates t Asiatic fleet, 
iss ued a st ate ment in late September t., a t the fleet would 
not be wit hd ra wn a nd t ha t it i·lOP l d acce pt any ttnecessary 
risktt to pro t ect Americans who still r emained in Chi na.5 2 
Durin g t he first several months of hosti'lities when 
the United St a tes Govern ment was maki ng every eff ort to 
protect American lives and pro perty, President Roosevelt 
had pur osely refrained from a plyin g the Neutr ality Act of 
1937 to the 1ar in China . 53 Under the provisions of thi s 
act, it 1a s left a prero gative of the Pre-side _nt to deter-
mine when ant te of war existed bet ween t wo countries. lf 
he formally decl red tb. Eit t .10 or more powers were at war, a 
mandatory and i mparti a l embar go upon loans and munitions 
exports to bel li gerents auto matic ally be can1e operative . 
The isola t ionist arc hitects of the Neutra l ity ct had t hus 
ho ped to eli min ate the possi bility of some "incidentrt 
occurrin g vhich would dra w t he United States i nto a con-
f lict f or whic h it was not re sp onsible.54 
The President's rea sons for not calli ng the 
Neutr a lity Act i nto effect were twofold . First , by 
1938 ), 
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51Gris wol d , p. 461 . 
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a pplyin g the a ct to t he Sino - J ap anese conflict ..:, h e sm.1 th a t 
he wold be hel pin g Ja pan and hurtin g China . If Ameri can 
ves s els tlere pre vente d f ro m carr yi ng materials of war to 
the two belli ger ents, no pa rticul ar ha r dshi p would be 
worked upon the Ja p'nese who had no shorta ge of' weapons . 
The Chi nese, however, woul d be le f t virt ua lly de fe nseless. 
Second, if t he American Government de cl are d China and Ja pan 
to be at war--a conditio n which the gover nments of both 
countries had not acknowled ged to ex:i.st ---i t mi ght prov e 
re ,;.;rett ab le . 11Names count; a war mi ght be hard er to end 
t han an i ncident. tt 55 
There was also th e possi bility th at a neutr a lity 
procla rn tio n mi ght le ad to a f or mal declaration of war be-
t ween t he t wo belli eer ent nations . If Japan t hen invoked 
t he r ules of war and demanded t he ·dthdrawal of the armed 
for ces of al l t hird parties fro m China , the Ameri cans res-
ident there would be left h'i t h out t he sli ghte s t vesti ge of 
prot ec tion _.56 Ja pan mi ght go still one st.op fa r ther and, 
under t he privile g es gra nted by internatio nal lm·r in tirn e 
of war , challen ge the ri ght of the Unit ed States to trade 
with China. I f Ameri can mer chant vess el s were sto pped by 
Ja panese vrar shi p s and car goes se iz ed or destroyed, there 
would be no telli ng whe r e recri .nina.tions mi ght end . 57 
Despite the very real possibility that the United Stat es 
mi gh t beco me i nvolved i n a forei gn war as a direct 1"esult 
11;. /) 
55Fei s, P• 10. 
56•raylor , Forei gn Policy . Reports, XI I I ( February 
1938 ), 281. 
57ttull , I , 5 58. 
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of i mposin g t he Neutra l ity Act, Americ an is ola tionists 
never tired of denou ncing Pre si 1ent Roosev elt for hi s fail-
ure to apply the measu re . 
As it was ,, t he danger of j_nter feren ce with Ameri can 
shi ppi ng in the western Pacific al most forced the admin -
istr ation's hand on t his issue . On August 25 , 1937, the 
Ja an ese fleet proclai med a blo ckade aga i ns t Chinese shi p-
pi ng alon g the China coa st . For ei gn merc hantm en were not 
mentioned .. The fo llowi ng da y , howev er , Japanese naval 
authorities declared that f orei gn vessels mi ght be boarded 
for purposes of proper identi f ic at io n . Furth er more , th e 
Japanese Governm en t reserve d t he ri ght to con f iscate 
vessels carr yin g car goes th a t in ti me of war would be con-
sidered contr aban d . 58 nly a. f ew days later• t h e acciden• 
t a l bombing of the u. s . s. Pres:i,dent Hooyer by a Chinese 
flier led Admiral Yarnell to 1.-:arn Ameri can merchant shi ps 
to . ke no furt he r e alls at Shan ghai. Such a r ap id su c-
ce s si on of in ci dents were fr esh tinder for th e advocates of 
an i unedi a te declaration of the United States' neutrality . 59 
Thes e even ts in Asian \:mters occ ur red at the very 
mo 1ent 11hen isolat i onist grou ps i n th e Unit ed States were 
f ocusi ng t h e publ ic attention upon the sai lin g of the 
it ic h ita., a government-o wned vessel carr yin g e. car go of 
nineteen pla ne s destined for the Chinese Govern ment.60 
Wit h an eye toward rec ent happeni ngs in the Far East, 
15, 
58Taylor , Foreign Policz Report~, XII I (Febr uary 
1938) , 2$0 . 
59I bid ~, p . 284 . 
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See-retary of Stat e Hull announce d on August 27 that tie 
United States Govern ment rese r ved all rights on its behalf 
and on behalf of' i .-~s national s for damages to· or lo ss of 
American lives or pr operty sustained as a result of Japane se 
military a cti vities . 61 Four days la te1 "' ca me the Ja pane se 
re ply . The Mini ter of Forei gn Affair s, Ko-co Hirot a, 
informed Washington that the gove rn ment of Japan was not 
li ab le f or damages or l1c.:sses suffered by nationa ls of third 
pa rties a s a result of -the f i ghting in Ohina .62 With this 
announcemen t , neutralists brou ght even great er pressure ·to 
bear upon the · ad.minis tr ation i n an effort to forc e the 
Neutr ality Act into eff ect.63 
On September 14, 1937, Secret ary Hull in structed 
A>nba-ss ador Jose ph Grew· t.o inform the a ut horities in Toky o 
that the United State ,s Governm.errt co ul d not a cce pt the 
contention of th~ Japanese Government that it was not to be 
held responsible for darnages sustaine~ by nationals of t h ird 
partie s .. The United States would continue to look to Japan 
for comnensation whenever damage or loss was eA'J)er ienc ed by 
America n s in China .64 On that same d-ayt however , the 
Preside nt &lll'lo~ ce d t hat merchant ves$els o,1rn:d by the 
United Sta tes Govern ment wer ·e no lo · ger pe r mi tted to carry 
611roreign , elations: . J_aQan, .J..221-19l1:l, I, 490. 
62 I bid ., p . 492. 
63The pl an es aboard the Wi chi ta were subsequen tl y 
or d-ered unl oaded at . San Die go, Cali.f or nia . 'l'hey f i nal ly 
found t heir way to Ghina. via Eur ope. 
64-Foreign 1;,ela t io n s: Ja pan , 1931-1 241,. I, 497. 
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any sort of war materials to eit her Japan or China. Any 
pri va te A1-nieric an vessel carryin g a.rticles of w r. to either 
belli geren t would hen ce f orth proceed at its m,m ri 0 k.65 
Since Americ -11 shi ppers could engage in carry:i..ng 
war materia ls to · Japan at virtu ll y no risk, the Presi<ient•s 
declaration did not bear equa lly upon both warring powers . 
But by partially invoki ng one provision of the N0ut .rality 
ct , oosevelt '.was ctble -to t a.'ke the edge off t.he sha r p proi""' 
-, 
te s ts th at 1:l' . d been comi ng fr om the isol tionist camp 
throughout August and most of Sept ember, 1937* The- demands 
t0 :i.nvoke the :neutrality statute were never ag~in as strong 
a s they ha."'1 been in those f irst . t w·o mont hs of the und eclared 
Sino ... Ja.panes e war.66 
President Rooseve lt had successfully withstood the 
intense pre esure which. .the i solati~-,n ist-s had t hu.:s far 
br-ou ht to ·e ar upon hi m. He had persistently refused to 
abandon Americ an citizens and t he ir int eres ts in Chi na to 
the t nder mercies o.f the J ap anese .- But the office of the 
chief exec utive is such th at he must always seem to f ollow 
public opinion, or at le ast not go too .far out in front o:f 
it. , On October 5-, 1937; howeve r, Roo sevelt v iol ated this 
unwritt en l aw in h is memorable Quarantine Speech at 
Ch ica go; the isola .tionist ca pit a l of America . It ev ,ok~d 
such an upro ar from the non.i ntervention ist camp th at the 
adrnini st r ation. was for ced - to mak e, a hasty retreat . 67 
_______________________ .,;..,   ~-
65Bi s son, 
66I bid. 
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The 0 resident's Quarantine Speech was a po1 erful 
address whic h contained the stron gest t hreat of coercive 
action again st Ja pan that had_ t nu s far been made by the 
United States .6S I n his addr ess, Roosevelt referred to war 
as a "contagion" and observe d th at a "quarantinett was t,he 
communit y-' s usual method of checking an epidemic. He spoke 
of t he need f or '' positive ef fortsn to pt•eserve the pe ace of 
the world.69 His sug gesti on th at those nations infected 
with t he epidemic of international l awlessness should be 
put in qua r antine smacked sharply of some sort of embar go, 
.and its timing hinte d th at t he President had Japan in mind. 
This was follo wed the next day by a press release fro m th e 
Depart ment of St a te which concurred with the League's de-
ci s ion t ha t Ja pa n had viol at ed both t he· Ni ne- Power Tr eaty 
and the Kello gg-Briand. Pact by its unwarranted attack upon 
China.70 
The President's for ce ful atti t ude at Chicag o came 
a s a surprise to the Americ an public, His harsh tone 
crea t ed alarm among a l ar ge se gment of his f ello w country ... 
. men, and most Americans reject ed hi s nquar antinett sug ... 
ge sti on . The pro posal had come too abrup tl y; it was too 
ra dic al a de parture fr om t he President's past co 1mnents on 
fore i gn affairs. A few grou ps rus he d t-o his support, but 
t he rest of the nation and most of the members of Congress 
were opposed. Psycholo gi cally, the country was not 
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pre pared for such a st atemen t and ·was unwilli n f or th e 
United · St ates to adopt a more vi gorous role in i nternati onal 
politics. Americ ns ,·rere still convi nced tha t the nep -
ide mic" could not reaeh t hem. ffTh ey preferred to isolate 
t hem elves, rather than jo in in an uncer tai n ef f or t. to wipe 
out t he disease.n71 
Presi dent Roosevelt i mmedi at ely realized th t he 
had gone too far, too fast. At a press conference held on 
t he day follm ·rin hi.s Chica go speech, the President refused 
to amplify his re marks of the previous day , frustrating the 
best efforts of ne smen to draw hi m out on th e subj ect. 
Vfhen th e Ja panese Ambassador , Hirosi Saito, as ked Secretary 
Hull on Octo ber 7 whether t he United St ates Govern ment had 
anythin s ecif i c n mi nd , ull. st ate d that no action was 
conte mpl ated f or t re time be in g .72 
'l'his act Ii sio n by t he American Secretary of St te, 
followed shortly by a ssura nces fr om Gre at Brit i n that no 
disci plin ary act ion against Ja pan wa s bei ng contemp l ated i n 
that quarte r, rornpt ed the Ja panese to give ~otice that 
they would not attend th e Nine- Power Conference whic h had 
bee n summoned to meet at Brussels on Octo ber 30, 1937. The 
announced purpose of th is meetin g was to fin d a pea ce £ul 
solution 0£ t he crisis in China. Fr ance and Great Br itain, 
preoccu pied ".vi.t h 1,..rorsening conditions in Euro pe, had 
infor med t he United tates i n advan ce that as hin to n would 
hav e to t ake the le ad i n effecting any such "quarantines" 
71Feis, p. 12. 72 Drummond, p. 62. 
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in the Far East as t he President envis:i.oned . 73 The obvious 
unreadiness of the Ameri can public f or coer cive ste ps on 
the one hand and the gove rnment's un.:.rillingness to rm-·-mrd 
Japan 's aggr es s ion in China on the ot her complet e ly ham-
str ung th e Americ an delegation,74 
The confer ence, under th ese circumsta nces, proved 
futile . Japan , one of th e parties to the di spute , was ab -
sent f rom t he pro ceed1.ngs. Fran ce and Great Brit ain would 
not take the lead against J apan . The United dtates could 
not . It ende d after three weeks wi.th the democrat ic st at es 
reiteratin g t h eir concer n for the territorial i nte grity of 
Ch ina, but not in g was done to inst.ill a si milar sentiment 
i n Ja pa n:. The t otal failur e of ~he conf'e:r ·ence was un der-
s cored by Tokyo's defiant ann ounce ment that, it would brook 
no i nterf ere nce by third part ies i1rlth 'its po lic y i n Ch i na , 75 
On ec0mbe:r 12, 1937, t he most seri ous in cide nt 
sin ce the outbreak of t he Sino-Ja panese war occurred when 
Ja pan ese aviators bombed and sank the Unite d t'tes gunb oat 
Panay . The Panai had been es corti ng three Sta ndard Oil 
Company t ankers down t he Yangtze River when t he attack 
oc curred some twenty miles up .. river from ank i ng . 'l'he cir-
cumstan ces surro undi ng the attack sug ested deliberate 
provocation , sin ce th e nationality of all the vesse ls was 
clearl y des i gnat 0d by mean s of l ar ge ensi gns and painted 
73Gris wold, PP• 459-60. 
74,ra yl or , Foreign Pol ic y Rep orts, XIII (February 
1 5 , 19 3 8 ) , 2 $6 • 
75Joh n Mor ton Bl um, From the Mor ~enthau Diarie s: 
Years of Crisis , 1928-19~8, I (Boston~ Houghton l\fifflin 
Co.~ 1959}; P • 462. 
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flags . The survivors of ·the initial attack were machin e-
unned as they escaped fr om the sinking ships, and the 
.Pana.z had been momentarily boarded by Japanese pers onne l 
:from r my motorboats. As result of repeated '"'ir attack, 
three AmAricans were killed and many others wounded . 76 
In the United States, there ·was only a momentary 
outbur~;t of indi nation, and demands for the vith 'raNal of 
all American s from China actually increased rather than 
di rnini~hed . 77 On Capitol Hi l l, Congressmen impressed upon 
the public the necessity of remaining calm so th·t the 
forces of peaceful arbitration would have an opportunit.y t o 
work o ta. quick and satisfa ctory settlement.?$ 
The day follo ,dn g the bombine , Senator illiam H. 
S athers of New Jersey sent a l eJcter to Secretary Hull 
favorinrr the removal of a l l American c i tizens and vessel s 
f r o n t he area affected by the c onf1.j_ct . In his reply of 
Dece1 ber 18 , Hul l remind ed the Senat or that for s evera l 
generations, Ameri cans had gone to China and had establish ed 
themselv es there in variou s occupat.ion s and act i vi t ies . He 
pointed out that, along with other governments, t.he United 
States h d aGcevted various rights and incurred various ob~ 
~ -
lig::1tion s. As fil le d with danger as the present situation 
might be, many Americans could not suddenly cut the 1sel ve s 
off from the interests of a life~tim e , nor could the • 
Sess., 
76lbid . , I, 485. ??osgood, p. 404. 
78u. s., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 2nd 
1937, LXXII, Part 2, 1968. 
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American Government suddenly abando n its obli ations and 
responsi bilities.79 
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This rosaic reiter atio n of the United States' 
moral duty t o uph ol d internatio nal agree ment,s gave no in-
dication of t he discord whic h had been produced among ad-
mi nistr ative off icers by the Panax crisis. There had been 
considerable debat e within Rooseve lt's cab i net concer ning 
the steps to be ta.ke n if dip lo macy f ai led to solve the cri-
si s. Both the President and the Secret ary of St ate be-
lieved th at t he attack had been del ib erate, si mply another 
i ndication of Ja pan 1 s desire to f orce all v est erne rs from 
China. 80 Vice~ Presi dent Garne r t hought that only a show of 
f orce would hav e any ef fect upon the Ja pan ese. Roos~velt, 
however, was confident th at economic sanctions could bring 
Ja pan to t er ms withou t war. gl Admiral Willia m Leahy , Chief 
of Naval Operation s, ur ged t ha t the f leet be prepared f or 
action at s ea., a move supported by the ~resident's adviser, 
Nor man H. Davi s,. and by Assi st ant S·ecretary of St a te, R. 
tlalton Moore. The Presi dent and othe r members of his 
st aff , however, resisted any suc h provocative action.S2 
Secre t ry of the Tr easury , Henry Mor gent hau , consistently 
t h e advo cat e of more .f orcef ul measu res against Japan , was 
79r ul l, I , 565 . 
aoHarol d L. Ickes , 
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qui tc wi . li n to o to far ov er the f&n;ay i s su e. IIe 
st re. sis ed h is pprehen s:l.on that if Ja pan w :re .ll ot'ied t o 
co nti nue u .• oppos ed, t here wou l d :>e no end to its ad vances. 
:i.n t 1.e Paci f ic.. Hi s ass i s t n t, w. y:ne Taylor, r e l ied t ha t 
it 1,,.rou d be Hcockey edn t o r i sk •·•ar ov$r suc h n 1.ssue, $3 
Such was the egree of divi s i on wi t hin t l e admi nJstr tion . 
"'her e w"s , ha pil y erwtgh ,, no occasio n .for a ction . 
The J a p- ne s e Gover nment ha ot ene d t o r.na.ke th e .. Jost effu sive 
of apo lo gi e s , pro mi s ed to ay t he i nd ernn jJ_,ies a.sked f or by 
t he Unit ed St tes, gave r enewed as sur ances of res pe-ct for 
Amer i c n r i ghts and in t ere sts i n Chi na, an ' i ndic ated -that 
the _ · 1ita r y of f icers re s ?on s ib le f or t he holly unauthor-
ized att a ck ·would b e pv.n ished. On Dece .;1be r 23, the United 
St tes. Gove r nment of f ici a lly acce pted t he J· p~ne s e ~.polo gy, 
and by Christm as Day , 1937, t he m0 tt ar was eon~ide r ed 
closed. t 4 
Appr e:e nsio n amon~ America n off ic i al s continued 
eve n af t er t he Pan~ i nctde nt had bee n sati sfa ct orily re-
s olved. The J p -ese m:tlit ary, vhic h had 1 one much to 
prov oke t he war in Chi na, lta l r eve aled a bra zen disrega rd 
J':'or American i nter e sts . The ci vil a .u or i ti es in Toky o, 
or eo-ver, h d f a iled to make the milit ary admit its part i n 
t h e at t a ck . The t hre ats whi ch t his dang ero u s s itu·· ti on 
. . 
po s ed f or t .h e fut ure , ere r e c ,:,n i zed by A.mba ss ! 'or Gr:ew. On 
Dece mber 26 , 1937, he wrot e: 
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War between Ja pan and the United States wil l not come 
through mere interference or even destruction of our 
tan gible i n terests in Ch i na ; or yet f t •om the breach 0£ 
treaty ri ghts, or t he breakin g down of princi ples for 
wh ich •rn stand, but war may very easily co me from some 
.further act in dero gation of American soverei gnty. • • , 
Theret n J.ies t he dan ger an•:l it is a re a l dan ger wh ich 
no one with knowled ee of the irres ponsibility of th e 
Japanese military as distin guished fro m the Japanese 
Government can eliminate from the future pictu re~ ,e5 
The anomaly of undecl a red though unli mited warfare 
provi ded a le gal basis for di plomatic efforts by foreign 
governments to protect the lives and pro perties 0£ their 
nationals wit h in the war zones of China. 86 Great Britain , 
with .its extensive economic investments in China, was 
keenly interested in . ro motin g joi nt r. ction among the 
i estern powers in defense of treaty rights. The Am~rican 
Government , however , was not receptive to any suggestion of 
a multilateral underta kin g anywhere in the world . The 
United States preferred to retain its ability to a ct in ... 
dependently and without reference to any foreign ally" 87 
Ja pan was careful to do nothin g which would di-
minish Ameri ca's aversion for colle ctive measures,., Every 
effort was made to prevent the United States from becoming 
irritated to the point l1here it would seek to make common 
ca use with Great Britain against the ambitions of J apan in 
East Asia . 88 In the interest of preventin g Angl o--Americ an 
85Joseph c. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1944) , p . 246. 
86Quigley; p . 213 ,. 
$7'l~ay lor, For_.§ign _PoliCI Renqrt_§, XII I (February 
15 , 1938 ), 284, , 
86Grew1, p. 244. 
coo perati on in the Far East , Ja nese authorities in the 
occu ied reas of China were · con sistently , ore solicitous 
of Americ an than British rights . 89 
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A most st ri king manife station of this ele ment in 
Japanese di plomacy occurred at the time of the Pana¥ crisis. 
Tokyo had rushed to meet the demands ·of the Depar tment of 
State in an effort to settle the matter before ~ popular 
antagoni sm could build up in the United States~ At the 
conclusion of the crisis, th e Japanese Minister of Forei gn 
Affairs presented a not e to American representative s in 
Tokyo outlining the steps t hat had been taken to prevent a 
recurren ce of su ch an "ac cident ... " 'rh e note cite d nava l 
orders whi ch had been issued instru ctin g that the gr eatest 
caution be exercised in area s where Ameri can warships or 
other v0ssels were located, "even at the sacrifi ce of a 
strate gi c adva.nta.ge.n In addition, 11ri gid orders" had been 
issued to military, nav 1, and Forei gn Offi ce authorities 
to give greater attention to the instructions which had 
been ttre peatedly givenn against inter f erence with the ri ght s 
and interests of the United States 4 St eps had lready been 
t aken , the Japanese Forei gn Offic e conc lude d, to more · fu lly 
ascertain t he location of American nationals and their in-
terests .in China . 90 
Thro ugh out 193.7 and 1938,- the weste rn powers made 
89Tayl or> i-l'oreign Policy Re:gorts, Xl~I (Februa r y 
15 , 1938 } t 2$5 . 
90Foreign Relations: Ja pan 1 1931-1 9{±1, I, 550 . 
75 
only parallel rc i1:res entati ons ,. ga.i ,. t vi ol ation s of tre-ity 
ri gh ts by th e c1rmed f .orces and. adr; inistra.tive agen t s of 
I mperi· l J""pa.n . Mo real cooperati ve effor t involving joint 
action by the gov ern mE>.nts of Gr oat Brita in, •r2ince, and th e 
United , St at es ,;, ould occur w1til mid-1 939 . 91 
Thr oughout 193H, the Depart ment of St "te dispa tched 
a serie"' of i .Lomatic notes to the author ivies in Tokyo 
rote s ,i ng a,a i nst J ap nese .maltreatment of Americ _ cit-
· zens in China, the seizure of t heir pro pert ies , and the 
freezin g o·t of A eric :on busines s by the es t abl i qhment of 
.. Japane se monopol i e s . 92 J ose ph Grew, the .Ameriean Ambass ador 
to Japan ,, w s t he recipient of a consta nt flood of protest$ 
fro m Americans who had s ff ered injury s a r esult of the 
Sino-Ja pa nese ,var. Su ch vi >lat i on s of Am.eri ccm ri ht s were 
the cons t ~nt subj.-:-ct of h is convers at io n s with the -lin ister 
of •'ore i ...,n. Af fairs . 93 
In the l as t six onths of' 1938, th e subject of 
A eri c ' n ri s:r t s in Chin a. ·was dis cu ssed with increasi n · f re -
q ency by AmericG:n and Ja nese officials. The month o.f 
July wa$ narked y t h untiring efforts of Am.b·:ss or Grew 
to obta i n Ja pan 's r espect f or the divers e .America n i nt erests 
wld ch exi st ed in China. ,. n Ju l y 4 , Grew p sse d nearly 
t .e hours in conf er enc e rith t h e ll.d.ni r.;t/:)r of ro r ign 
Affa irs, expl or in- the ent ire fie l d of Americ an interests 
9l Bisso n , American ..E2],.icy i n ·the_•ar East , pp . 8£,- 89. 
92t1ull , I, 569 . 93arew, p . 266 . 
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in Chin"'. The .Japanese Gov~rnment assured t h e United 
St ates that American treaty ri ghts would not b-e curtailed.94 
In early October , Ambassa ~or Gre w presen ted to the 
.Japanese Foreign Office a bill of parti cul ar s ,irhieh had 
been dr wn up at Pres i dent ~oosev elt' s re que st. Ir.1 t h is 
statement, the Preside ·nt pointed out that desp i te repe ated 
assurances by the J,panese Gove.rm:nent, vio l ations of' 
American rights and interests in China had pe rsisted. i'he 
United St tes now asked that th~ assurances so frequently 
given :Ln t e pas t be i mplen1ented. pe ci fi cally, tha 
President requested that pro . . t and effective measur es be 
t- ken to ( 1) end the discrirainatory currency exchange con-
trol whi ch l'rd been im_ ose d upon areas of vhina under 
Ja.pan's control; (2) sus"end any monopo listic practices 
whi ch served to deprive P..meriean nat:i.onals of their le git-
imat e share of the tr ade ana. indufitry .i . Chin.a; ( 3) dis-
continu e i .n.terference by Japanese authorities with American 
pr operty and other :r-ights, including restrictionn upon 
America n trade <':Ind shi 1 p in g . The ctin g Minist.,er of Porei gn 
Affa .irs, ri n c~ Fumimaro Konoye, replied by once. again 
00 i ving fu ll assuran c l!3s th,;i,t the Open Door in China •:muld be 
frstea fa tl y !tl' intained . n95 
On Novemb r Zl, l ong conver~r ti on occurred bet :reen 
the American Ambassador and the newly desi nated orei gn 
Aff a irs ·nis te rt Hachiro lrita . Grew asked that i mmediate. 
94Grew, pp . 251-,52. 
9 5Fore:Lgn , Relat1.9q _s: . tla p a,n, ,). 931-191+1, 1 1 781 - 5. 
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step -s be t ak en to hal t the ir attacks whi ch were des-
troying American commercial and mission·ry properties, lo-
cated in are a s often far removed from the .scene of military 
o erations. l'h ese unwarranted attacks were taking pla ce 
constan tly a s "daily re .' ortsn pouring into the Embassy 
clearly showed . He rejecte d the Ja panese explanation that 
these outrage s were accidental because of t,he 0 volu me and 
constancy -of these depredations -. tt He a lso asked t hat the 
lo wer s.tretches of t h Yan tz~ River be made ac cessible to 
Am~rica.n trade nd shi ppin g , since Japanese mercha ntmen 
were openly engaged in commerce both up and down the river. 
The American Govern ment ur ge ·d that this discrimination be 
ended without further delay . 96 
~1t h re gard to the future of American co .orce in 
China, Ambassador Grew asked the Forei gn Minister if there 
was any element of t:ruth in the allegation that American 
tr ade with China w0uld 1 in areas under Ja pan ese control, be 
tolerate d only if conducted thro ugh Ja panese middle men. In 
res ponse to this inquiry, Arita aut horized the American 
Ambassador to ive SecrGta.ry Hull a "c ateg orical denial.n 
Japan desired and i ntended to assurt1 for itself certain raw 
materia ls, th-e Ja panese Minister confided, but '1there would 
be a very l ar ge and probably increasing field for American 
tr ade and ot er enter prise.n97 
Su ch artifi ce and dissimu lation, however, could no 
96Grew1 P• 257. 
97Forei gn Relcations : Ja pan, 1921-1941, I, 807. 
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longer conceal Ja p~..n's bitiion to eli min a te all for~ign 
comrnerc~ ft •o. the China mainl!':lnd . Only thr ee days before 
A.rita 's conversa ti on with Gr ew, t he Ja an~se Government had 
nnouneed t1 a t it in te n e to n.ale the ob~erv ance of the 
princi ple of eq uality of oppo rtunity in Chi na ccmditional 
u >on t e acce pt nee by t h e United .:.::>ta tes an d the other 
powers o.f c:i 11new order" in ·,•, st Asia. 98 
As 193 8 drew to a close, 1'okyo co ntin 1ed to ~ive 
assuran ces concern:in t he futu re of t he Open Door , but 
t he se a s surances were increasin gly Sllrrottnde by such qu.al ... 
i.f'ieations as to mak e t ' em virtually mea nin gl ,~ss. 99 On 
December JO, 1'.\.mbas ador Grew hand ed the Ja panese Govern ment 
-the la.st di plo matic note of the yec:. r. In t h l.S mes s.age,, 
Grew r eit er ated t he Americ an ov ermon t's position th at the 
principle of commercial opportunit y in China was not $Ub-
ject to nul li fication by uni1 ateral action on the part of 
J p n. Th e Unit ed States, t he mes t•age con cluded , 'l!'TOUld not 
acknowled e or consent to 
ri ght s. 100 
y i mpa1.l"m~nt of it . treat.y 
T e Open . oor, ho •10ver, cou ld not be held ild e by 
mere wor ds. Tne represeritation s made by .American di plomats 
on behalf of American commercia l interests in China did 
little more t han amass clc>1irns ag i . t t he J p nes e 
Govern ment. Grew believed th t i nterfe r ence ilith Auerican 
treat y ri ght s would end only when t he Ja pan ese wer e given 
9Brbid. , p . !;100. 
100 rbi ., pp . $20 ... 26 . 
99!bid., pp . 814-16. 
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reason to be lie ve t ha t the United St.ates mt gh t o something 
more than talk .101 Subsequ ent ev ents wer e to prove him 
ri ght i n t his jud gement;. Onl y • the gri mmer days of 1939 and 
beyond lay _ahead. 
101a - r.,.. 
· · rew , p . 2,~. 
CHAPTER IV 
TH• I p_ CT O AMERIC ·J C01I?l 'RGIA,, I NTE' ES'l1S ON 
lTNI'l'...m "'T T s OLICY: Ai AS ., ,;ss M.ENT 
Commercial Intere ts in Relation to 
Majo r Political Factors 
BO 
Then Ja pan i nvade d the Asia n mainla nd in 1937, 
Americ an busines smen i n Chi na i nsi sted that the United 
St ates Gover ent "rovid e the f u1lest pro te ctio n f or them ... 
sel v s and fo r their inve st ment$. This demand was base d 
s uarel y upon the guar antee s embodied wit h i n the doctrin e 
of t he Open Door , an av owed pol:Lcy of t h e Uni t ed .... t at.es 
~overrunent sin ce th e first day s of t he t wentiet centu ry . 
With t he pro mul ga tio n of th e en oor in 190 0 , equal it y o.f 
commercial oppor tunity wit hin China and th e t err itori al 1n ... 
te grity of Chi na had be come of f ici al objec tives o.f America n 
policy in t e F'ar East . I t wa~ onl y l ogi ca l, t ~en, t ha t 
Ameri c n citizen s with a f i nan ci 1 sta ke in Chi na ex pec t ed 
t he ir gov er nment to de.fen d the --rri nci ples of the Open Door 
in the f ace of Ja anese i mperialis m. 
The $U s qu ent e.1.f,orts of t h e United St at es 
Gov er nment to mainta i n the treaty ri ght s of its n.;tio nals i n 
China mus t not , ho ,-:eve r, be tak en as an i nd ic at io n of th e 
succes whi ch the busin ess coro unity en joy ed i n its 
attempts to prod Washi.n ton to.t~rd a more spirited defense 
of American intere ts . Be ore t he role tth ich merican bus-
iness interests pl ayed in formulatin g Jnited States policy 
can be accurately as s essed, the factors ·: nieh motivated the 
government's decision to uphold American treaty ri ghts in 
China must be tl1:orou.ghly explored . Such an investigation 
must begin wit h an analysis of the policies and attitudes 
whic h have been. of signif 'ic nee in Sino- American relations . 
The Open Door Policy as i t found expression in 
China has a.h 1ay~ occu pied a r~ther ambi guous positdon with • 
in the general framework of United States forei gn policy . 
Thi.s ambi guity was matched by the ambivalence r ather than. 
consisteney and singleness of purpose which has ch acte,t ... 
ized American thou ght about the role of the United tntes 
in Asia .1 
The basic principles of American foreign policy 
have been '1f~w., si mple, and enduring . n I n tho public mind, 
the substance of United States policy abroad has been em-
bo ied ih t wo fundament 1 concepts: nonen.tengle ment and 
the 1-lonroe Doctrine, Fro m the days ' :ihen the . . t onr -oe Do-etrine 
was ,p laced in ~ff ect to the eruption of World War I!, no 
two ideas have enjoyed such oon$i~1tent support among th e 
American people. This firm a herence at the grass roots 
level of American ·society can largely be attributed to the 
fact that both policies were conceived of as being in-
timately assoc i ated with homeland security . Z 
1Neumann, p. 133. 
Until 1900, t e Open ~Joor w s in "' 11 c on s nance 
with tie pr evailing tone o United. St · tes forei i..>n pol icy; 
equalit, of commercial opportunity etery where i n the world 
· as mt~rely an ex pr ession o.· th at b· si c A111erican n-otj~on of 
fn ir pLay. At the ti m of the Boxer 1 bellion in China, 
howev r, Secretary of ~t, ')te John Hay had e:xt@nded the open 
do or to j_nclude, not only commerci a l equality with in the 
Chines e Empire , but al so res pect for China's territorial 
inte grity as well. By this pronouncem nt , Hay p lac ed the 
Uni ted St a tes under obli g ,:ition to preven t t h e dis menibero nt. 
of ,h ina by foreign powers . :F'reedo from s erious involve-
en t in the :. oli ti cal entan g le ments of East rn .Asia would 
henceforth be virtually impo~sible . 3 
With the offici l promul .i:;ation of the (pe n Door 
Doctrine in 1900, the traditional American princi ple of 
noninvolvement int e af f air s of d istant lan ds had been 
v' ola.te · • mhe United St a te had beco me the t, 1eoreti cal 
e;uar dian o_ hinese soverei . ty, an obli ation far beyond 
American shores . It was, in fact, an obli g tion w ich the 
Americ an Go,1ernment app arently ha d no int ent ion of ful-
f illin g . If t he United St ates had entertained any serious 
notion of enforcing commercia l equality in Chi.na or of 
pres erv in g China's t erritorial :i.ntegrity in a.cccr dan c e ·with 
the pro visions of the Open Door, it would need assista nce . 
It, wou ld have to ego t i a-te alliances , under tandir. g s , or 
other a rr angem nts of mutual a~.vant 8 re w~i ch ,rould either 
3"' . Griswold, p . 7, 
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supple ment its own lim i ted power or const r uc t a tr ust .rorthy 
po litic al substitute. Such pr ovisions , however , wer e neve r 
f orthc oming . Wides prea publ ic indiff er en ce to mat ters be -
yond American shores pr ecluded the poss i bility that any 
steps would be tnken which would se rv e to br ing nat;iona l 
power in t o balan ce with this new tu rn i n na t iona l pol i cy, 
Havi ng so abru tly a.equi r e a political stake in the dis-
tant west ern Paci fi c, the Ameri can people quickly exerted 
their privile ge to igno r e it.4 
The Open Door has from the beginn in g , then, st.ruck 
a r · th er hol lo w note in Unite d Sta.-tes foreign polic y . The 
Far ~ast was too re mote from t he experience of most 
Americ an s to genera te any active concern for Ameri can in--
t eres ts in China.5 United States offici a ls, moreov er, 
never exhib ited any deep concer n f or the i ndependen ce and 
integrity of Ch.ina bec ause t hey f ully realized that their 
.fello w count ry men would not fi ght to uphold the Open Door 
in an area ha lf- way around the •mrld from them . 6 1• enever 
the Open Door was challenged, the United St ates Government 
limited its r es ponse to the si mple de cl a.rat i on th t it 
would refuse to reco gnize a,ny agree ment or unde rs tanding 
i\'hieh would i mpair the treaty ri ghts of American citizens 
in China, or which would vi olat e the administr ativ e or 
territorial inte gr it y of th e Chinese nation.7 This 
4osgood. p . 79. 5Neumann, P• 1J4 . 
6Bemis, Americ?n 1i~oreig11 Pol,icy and Diplomacy, i:. 457 . 
?Bisson, American Fore i gn Pqlic y in the _ Fa,r E9-$t1 P• 12. 
techni ue had been emplo yed by Secret ary of State \'illiam 
J ennin gs Bryan at, the ti me of the notori ou s 'l'wenty ... One 
Demands in 1915. It was to be used agai n by Secretary ot 
Sta'te Hei:iry L, Sti mson when Ja pan ese armies overr an 
Manchuria in 1931-1932 •. 
Beyond suc h diplo matic re pro a ehes, however, the 
United St at es officials were n ver will:i,.ng to go. At the 
t;iroe of t he tra shington I ava l Oonfere nce ( 1921-1922}, 
Secre tar of tate · Charles Evans Hughes tol d the American 
de le ga tion t ha t the Uni t€d States tt ' woul d never go t,o war 
ov er any aggress i on on the par t of Japan i n China. t n 'f en 
years latert Elihu Root, who had served &s Secretary of 
State unde r The odore Roo s ev el t { 1905·-1909), could still 
wri te tha t it ha.d u "neve r ente re d t h e head'" of any 
American President or Secr etary of St at e to send forces to 
China in defense of the Open Door. 8 
In sho rt, the Open Door t-tas ex pend ab le. It had 
nev er expressed any vital interest of the American people 
or of their government. As an economic document concerned 
with commercial opportunit y in a distant land, it rep ... 
resen ted a hope rath er than a reality, an i deal rather than 
a policy . en threatened by t h e depredation s of some for-
ei gn power or combinat ion of vower s , t he United St at es had. 
gi ven verbal support ta the dua l princi ples of equality of 
commercial opportunity and the territorial integrity of 
BNeumann; p. 147 
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China, but th1t1re had neve r been any question cf usi ng armed 
f orce in def en~e of the Open Door . 
:Jhen Japan i nd.i c ted tts contempt for th e Open Door 
in 1931 !l d again in 1937, the United States . Gover nment 
ttached no great imvor tan ce to the mai ntenan ce of the 
tre aty s ·t ructure 10er s e. American statesmen had been faced 
with violations of the Open Door before and ha d never con-
sidered it i mportant enc gh t r:> ·wa.rrant more than an of-
ficial rotest or a state ment givin g notiee that no abridge ... 
rnent of · existing tr€a'ty r i .::hts would be reco gnized. But 
Japan t s. military activities on t he Asia n continent might 
si gnal more than an inf r ingement upon America's commercial 
opportunities , somet hing even beyond the viol ation of 
ChJna's territortal integrity. Japan's assau lt upon Ghina 
in 1937, fo l low i ng only five years after t he aggres s i on in 
ianchur ia , was increasingly interpreted. by Americ an of'f i ... 
ci a-.ls as bu t the beginning of a ge neral i mp ri a li st ic drive 
a.-cross the fa ce of Asia . oueh ambitio ns ·would ult ima tel y 
en anger the security of A ericafs Paci f ic pos sessions ::tnd 
disrt1 pt the balan ce of power which the ~ shing ton Tr eat ies 
ha d attempted to establish in Eas t Asia.9 
The concern of the United Sta tes Gover nment t hus 
transcended any i mmedi ate r ega r d for eit he r China• ·s te rri-
t oria l inte gri ty or the commercial i nte re sts of Americans 
i n China. Wit h Japan t hreate ning to dominate the whole of 
East Asia., it would have been impossi bly narrow fo r 
Ameriean etatesmen t-o gear the policy of the United S.tates 
to such li ·te d obje ctives as t he preservation of commer(l!ial, 
equa lit y in China or t he administrative integrity- of China , 
The pri mary objectiv e of United St tes diplo macy 
f rom the time of th~ anchurian inci dent. throu ghout the 
re mainder of the decade wa s to of f e~ some metumre of :re~is .. 
tance to Ja pan'~ iuiperialistie adventures i n the western 
Paci.fie wi t hout at the same ti me embroiling the Unite d 
States in war. Altho ugh minds ·were ransacked in a search 
for effec .tive ways of ea.using Japan to desist whi le kee ping 
the nation uninvolv ·ed, none could be fou nd~lO Fac ed with 
t his dilemma, the llnited Sta tes Goverrun.ent eonclu ded that 
it could resist Japan only by insistin g upon a strict 
observ an ce of -e; e inte r nationally r ecognized principles 
contain~d wit h in t he doctrine of the Open oor. American 
offic:i .. al.s w·ere under no delusions -concern:i.ng th e gra.ve 
li mit ations of 'SU.ch a purely mor tllistie fi>Olicy, but w.-1de:r 
existin g circ umst ances, it was t he only means at the gov·-
ermnent' s di sposal ~11 By de fend i ng the rj_gh:ts of Amerie .an 
nat io nal s in China , th e United St tes hoped to oustain or-
derly pro cesses in th e spher e of interna t ional relations .. 12 
In its desire to hinder Ja an's efforts at territorial 
acquisition., the American Gover nment was often led to 
P . l.O. 
12David H. Popper 
Sino - Japanes e Conflict," 
( August 1, 193 ,. ) , 120 .. 
ttThe .'fest er n Powe1"s and t : e 
orei gn Policy Report s, XIV 
. . . 
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di splay far more concer n ov~r Ch i a's er odin g sovereignty 
than it did interference wi th Americ an eco nomic privileges 
in Ch.ina . 13 
'l'he Open Door t therefore , provided the Uni ted 
States with the means by whi ch it hoped to deter Japanes e 
expans ionis m on th e Asian contine nt. If commercial in~ 
tel'·ests were protected and su stained i n the meantime, if 
China's administrative and territorial inte grity were pre ... 
served along the way, so much the bet t er ; but th e first ob-
je ctive of American st ates men was to offe r some measure of 
resisten ce t o the predator y instincts of J apan . Thi s hie r .. 
ar chy of interests must b appre ci a t ed if t he r ole pl ayed 
by Ameri can commercial i nt erests in China <lurin g the 
critical ye ars bef ore lorld War II is to be pro perly un der -
stood . 
When J apanese ar mies inva ded Chin a i n 1937, th e 
American Government had wanted to a ssist China in resisting 
'fokyo' s eff orts to extend the Empire . The pm'ilerf ul iso l a -
tionist sentiment at home, however , had made any form of 
assistance , political or economic, virtually i mpossible. 
St i mson, i n 1931 , ha.d found the Ameri can people i n no mood 
to depa rt fro m the nonentanglement tr adition; he had want ed 
to take fo r ceful mea sures aga i nst the J apan ese, but di s-
covered th at "the policy of i mposin g san ctions by for ce 
• had been r ejected by Amer i ca in its reje ction of th e 
League of Nations . nl4 
15 , 
13Taylor , Forei g11, Policy Repol"ts, XIII (Febru ary 
193$ ) , 278. 
14sti mson , p . 244 . 
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If' this was true at th e time of the· Manchurian 
crisis, it was even more true when Ja pan lau nched its 
military of fensive against China fi ;re years later• By the 
mid- 1 thirties; most Americans .hB.d firmly resolved never 
again to take part in t h e quarrels between foreign coun ... 
tries. This det ermination to avo id foreign en tan g,lements 
found elo quent expression . in the neutrality le gi sl ation of 
the year s 193 5-1937, passed in response to ove1~1helming 
public re .ssu:re.15 The . peak of isol ati onis t:; stre ngth was 
roba b y :rea.ch din early January, 19.381 when the full 
force of administrative oppositio was barely su.ff_cient _to 
defeat the mueh-deb a ted Ludlow we.r-re.fe renr .um at"Uendment ._16 
Behind thi .s gr im dete:t "mi nation to iso l ate America 
from the virus of ;forei gn wars la :y th e feeling of dis-
illusion ment which had swept over the country f ollowin g the 
Fi rst World War ... Th~ nation had reacted strongly against 
the Wilso nia n poli cy of exten siv e commit ments in the world 
at large11 Both the period of i mmense prosperity t,.ihich 
rolled across the nation durin g the 192-0's and the terrible 
econo mic depression which followe d it served to concentr ate 
American attention upon domestic rather than for eign 
matters .. 'rhos e who conducted the foreign affairs of the 
United States durin g the interwar perio d, while often 
15William L. Langer ands. Everett Gleason , 'rhe 
Challe n~e to Isolationis m, 1937-l940 {New York : Har per & 
Bros., 1952) ," P• 14-. 
16walter Millis, Arms and the State (New York: The 
Twenti.et,h Century Fund , 1958), P• 17. 
.far a.head of public opinion i n the bread th of their vision 
I 
and in their ~en se of the l ar er role vf1i ch t h e nati on 
ough t to play, had ·to t ak e account of this pre va iling mood 
whi ch had gr a sped the public mi nd .17 · 
fhu .s a li ne eame into be in g whi ch American states--
men fea r ed to cross. They could deplore t he act s or inter-
national b~nd itry whicb. wer-e tak i ng pla ce in t he world 
aro und the m. They could speak up in support of traditional 
national i l'lt er es ts .. But ·ith the pe ople of the Uni t ed 
states so zealously desirin g pe,ace , no Arneriean off icial 
felt. fre e to take any act io n that mi ght pos si bl y earry the 
nation to ward or i nto war.18 Perha ps. t he cul minating 
expressio n of t he ut opi an ide a lis m whi ch characterized the 
st ate of the pu.blie ' nd after World War I came about with 
the si gnin g of the Pact of Fari s :tn l at e August, 1928 . 
This pact-.-which was ae .leb:rated a cross the len gth an d 
breadth of the land ...... had s ought to end war 'by the fatuous 
device of maki ng it il le ga1.1 9 
The r ,enewal of the . Sino-Ja pane se conflict in 1937 
had put the paci f ist ele ment s into iull cry. Isolattonist s 
I 
in Congress and throu ghout the eountry demanded the evae · .... 
uati on of American civili ans and American armed force s 
from Cb.ina.20 Senator J. Hamilton Lew.is of Illinois 
Alf red 
11Perkins, pp . 2$4 ... 85-. 
19osgood, PP• 346--4711 
2
'\a ymond t. Buell 1 X:salateg 
A. Knopf, 19/+0}, p . 107. . 
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expressed a common feeling v en he obse r ved th at 
so long as the United St ates cqnt i nues to maintain a 
r egiment of soldier s [ i n China_J the prospe ct of 
collision betwe en those soldiers /and the Japanes~ is 
very evident •••• The time hns come Nhen our 
Govern~ent _should withdr~! that regiment from China 
and brin 0 it home •••• 
In the House of Represent at ives , Hamilton Fi sh , one of th e 
leadin,o, isol tionists , echoed this sentiment when he ur ged 
that "now is the ti me ••• to withdraw our armed for ces , 
[our/ gunboats , and to give up voluntari l y our extrate r ri -
torial ri ght s. "22-
The administration was f or ced to a ccede to this 
clamor f or withd rawal to th e extent of dec laring that all 
Americans who chose to remain in China af ter repeatP d 
w rni ng s to l e ve did so at their o~m risk , Moreover , on 
September ll1-, 1937 , President Rooseve l t announced t h t 
hen ceforth no government - owned vesse l would b e permi tted to 
carry muniti ons to China or Ja pan and th t any private 
vessels did so at their m·m risk . 23 On the •;rhole~ however, 
the govern ment persisted in its pol i cy of firm but cautious 
insisten ce of Americ n rights and interests in China , 24 
Even the sinking of the AILerican gunb o.:it Panay by 
the Ja pan e se on December 12 , 1937, did not lead to any 
popular outcry for war , Instead there were even mor e 
Se s s ., 
Zlu. s ., Congressional Record , 75th Cong ,, 1st 
1937~ LXXXI , ·art 7, 8178, 
22Ibid . 1 p . 8157 . 23Buell , p . 107 . 
24-Taylor , Foreign Polic;_y R_eRorts, XIII ( Febru ary 
15 ; 1938) , 2$3 . 
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caustic demands that the United States get its citizens 
and :i.ts naval cr af t out of the theater of war .2.5 One 
Congress man expressed th:l -s at~itud ~ quite succintly when h e 
remarked t hat ttif the American gunboat Pana_y had been at 
. ' . . ' _,.. 
home, it would not have been bombed .tt2 6 
The pos si bility that the Unit ed 'St tes might be come 
involved in a i,\rar with Japan ov er the destru cti.o n of 
American commercial interests in Chi na was re pugnant to in-, 
numer ble Congressmen . The fa ct that th e gunb oat pan9y had 
been eseortt ng th re e St anda rd Oil vessels at t h.e t i me or-
th e attack did not escape notice. It was beyond contempt 
that ttfor a little tr ade and a f~w doll ars in profits,ff 
Americ an offi c ials were willing to ri$k war ,.'Z7 The pro. 
tection of American commercial interests in China was not 
t.tworth invo lvin g t his na t io n of 1.30, 000 ,000 soul s in a war 
t hey wi,11 be cal led upon to fight an d pay for. r,2g Senator 
Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina spoke for many of his 
colleagues when he resolved that "we are not going to 
fo llo w the Am-eriean dollar around t he world to protect it." 29 
25char le s H. Smith, Public Opinion in a Democracx 
Oiew Yor k : Pr en t ice Hall; Inc., 1942} , P • 518. - 1 
26u. s., ~Ccnc;res sio na l Reco r d, 75t h Cong . ,~ 3rd 
Ses s ., 1938, LXXXIII, Pa.rt 9, 92. 
27Ib:td • , p ~ 113. 
28 U1o s . , Congre ssiona l Re-cor d , 75t h Co g . , 2nd 
Sess., 1937, LXXXYI, Pa rt 3, 6I I. 
29uM s., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3rd 
Sess., 1938, LXXXIII, Part I, 90. 
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Eff orts were renewe d and intensified after the 
Panay incident to compel the Adrrdnistration to withdraw 
Anterica.n nationals, natl the troops and ships prote ctil'¼g 
the m, from the \>rar zone s in China. There was a plethora of 
w~rnings that if the Unit ed States f a iled, to get its 
m rines ~-nd its gunb oats out of Chin ese territory, further 
incidents t·muld surely occur. Wo one could guarantee that 
American gunboats would not be 0 blown up by the Chinese in 
an effort to incite us a ,a inst the Japanese, or vice 
versa .n30 This fear was a cco mpa..11ied by the suspicion ·rhic h 
so me Congre ss men entertained that rre;mr British brothers 
across the seaa" were »doing their best to i nv olve us over 
in Ghinatt so that the United States woul d become involved 
in pr otecti ng Great Br itai n 's extensive investments in 
Asia.31 Thfl United Stct tes, it was cautioned, . must not 
again become t he treat's paw of Great Brita inti in the tar 
East as it ha d been on the · occasion of the official pro~ 
mul gation of the Open :Ooor.32 For: whatever vari ety of 
reasons, the vast majority of Congressmen, to gether with 
their fellow eitizens, rea ched the same concl usion: 
Ame:t"icans must be evacuated from. China. and £or all those 
30u. s ., Oo:ngres_$lonal Record , 7 5th Cong. , 3rd 
Sese-, 193S1 LXXXI!I, Part l, 863. 
Sess., 
3lu~ 
19371 
.32y_ 
1938, 
s ., Congressional Record, 75th Gong ., 2nd 
LXXXII J Part 2 -, 13 57. 
fxXx~ff~~;;f°3':12~'7f~rdt 75th Cong., 3rd 
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who remain , official rotc ction must -.be withdrai·m . 33 
The administration , nonetheless , continued to up-
hold t he treaty rights of American cittzens in China in the 
fa c e of' a hostil e public at home and an intemper ··te anta g-
onist abroad . The Department of State , however , remain ed 
"a cutely consciousr 1 of the pre:issures fro m the Ameri can 
pe ople for withdrawal of li Americans from China , and 
could do little more than file offi cia l protests with the 
Ja pan ese Government aga inst a fu -ture re ckoning .34 
The Open Door with its gua rantee of equal commer cial 
opportunity in China provi ded the United States Government 
with the only means by whi ch it could hope to obstruct 
Ja pa n's territorial ambitions ~ At the s me time , however , 
there was the constant danger that some incident involving 
the lives and properties of Americans might occur whi ch 
would draw the nation into war . This precarious situation 
was the source of considerable apprehe nsion within the ad-
ministration . American states men reco gnized with profound 
misgiving that to pur sue an objective in foreign policy , 
the Unit ed States Government was being compel led to sus t ain 
insignific ant finan cial interests under the most haza r dous 
circ umstances . 
Had there not existed the lar ger obj ective of de-
terring Ja pan , there is ample rea _son to beli eve that th e 
govern ment would have been in clined to .follow the 
33Masla nd , The Pacific Hi storical Review, XI 
(Se ptembe r, 1942), 283 . 
34Blum , I , 485. 
94 
suggestion that all Americans be removed fr om China.--a 
nation in which, after all t a ful l-sc ale ar ,1as being 
waged . The American Government had no intrins ic interest 
in the fortunes of business enterprises operat ed by United 
St.ates citizens in China . The opposi·t;ion wi thin 
Roosev el t's Cabinet to the notion of risking war to protect 
Sino-American commerce was qui te clear • . It was stron gly 
felt by several high administrative officials that the 
pr esence of a fe ~ Americans i'"Jith vested interests in China 
were oubjectin g the entire ·nation to a.."'l unreasonable degree 
of r isk. Vi ce · President Garn er was of this opinion . He 
obje-cted strenuously to the idea of risking war in the Far 
East for the sake of busin~ -ss, and he did not believe · that 
contin gents of United States troops were justified in 
China.35 Of like mind was Secr eta ry 0£ the Interio r Haro ld 
L. Ickes. !ekes r emarked that there was "no compulsion to 
invest money in f oreign enterprises'"' ·nd. that those who did 
so could not e.xpect the Ameri can Governlllent . tito sacrifice 
tho ·sands of lives and mi llions of treasux·e in an 
attempt to prote ct their investments.u36 
It see ms cl.ear, then, that the a ctivities of the 
American cm ercial interests in China were n ot successful 
in working any transformation upon the s@ntiments of the 
American publi c or upon the course of American policy 
toward Japan. The isolationist • i mpulse among the people of 
the United Sta tes not only remained strong after Japan's 
J6rckes, P·• 209. 
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assault upon China, but actnally i ntensified after th e 
Panav i ncident in De.cember, 1937. ''li thin hi P.'.h admin-o 
istrat:::i.ve circles in Vashington there was grave concern 
over the pos'"'ibility t ha t some incident mi ght occur from 
which ther e co uld be no retr i~at bec ause of t h e presence of 
vested American financial interests in China. . Only on the 
broad groun ds of curbin g Ja pane se expansionism was the 
necessity granted of upholdin g the complex system of treaty 
ri ghts wh:i.ch surro unded Americans and their pro perties in 
China . 
Commercial Interests in Relation to 
~ajor Economic Fuctors 
American trade and investments in China never ap-
proad ed t he pro portions which had · been predicted at the 
be P-in in g of the · t wentieth century,.37 The failure of Q I .. , 
American 'inve stments in China to grow cannot be attrj_buted 
to the lack of official ·protection and encoura gement on th e 
part of United States Government of f ici als. Rather it r e--
sulted in lar g e part. fro m the political and economic ba ck-
wardness of China which made the nation unattractive to 
American ca pital.3 6 41oreover , the American businessman was 
very ske ptical of China's pote ntialities. As lon g as it 
remained impossi ble f or the impoverished Chinese to absorb 
much in the way of imports fro m the United States , few com-
mercial gro ps foresaw the develo pment of the Sino - American 
371, asland, The _ Pa cific Historicd.l Review, XI ( Septem-
ber , 1942) , 282~ 
183 . 
381ockwood, Far Eastern ~urvey, V (August 12 , 1936),. 
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Commercial interco ur::ie \-1:i.th Ja 1an, howev er _, ha d 
grown -ste adily over t he yea rs. At t he t urn of' t he century, 
J a an ' s tr ade w:i.th t he United ,..,t c t es alrea y excEF·d ed that 
with China . By 1920 the va l u e of' Americ an sn les to Japa~ 
,-,as nearly five times that of sales to China . In contr ast 
to the political and econo mic chaos 1hich haunte d Ghina, the 
Ja p • nes e isl an ds were the mod el of civ •il tranquility, and 
the adaptation of wester n i ndustrial technolo gy had trans-
formed t he old Her mit Kingdom into a modern nation,40 
Ame1"ican businessmen were usual ly well ple as ed wi th thei~ 
contacts with Ja.pan. The Japanese were pro mpt in meeting 
their financial obli gations to Americ an export ers and the 
goodc:, imp orted from ,Japan ke pt up to quality st andar ds. A 
general feeling of good will and mutual respect had gr own 
up between the commercial gr oups in both countrie s . 41 
By t h e mid-'t h irties, J apa n was of f ar gre at er 
economic i mport an ce to the United States t han was China.42 
I n 1936 , China's sha re of America's fore:1.gn tr ade wa.s only 
2.5 per cent, while Japan's ·was 7.7 per ce nt. At the same 
ti me, American bu sines s i nves t ments in Japan ( ·•21 8 , 000, 000) 
were considera bly more extens i ve than those in China 
39}-ilasl an d, Th e Pa c:j_fj_c Historic al Review, XI 
(Septe mb er, 19l1-2}, .t..93. 
40Neumann, p . 136., 
41Mc:,sland, The Paci f ic _ Historic a l .Review, XI 
(Septe mber, 1942), 293. 
42flar ley, Far Ea$tern 0urvey; V (July 29, 1936); 170. 
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U l32,0 00 1 000} .. ·3 Suffice it to sFy t ha t among a L,,lrge 
proportion of American e orting and i mport in g fir ms doing 
business with all or several of the ·-· s t Asian -cou ntries , 
Ja pan was both the best cust omer and the chief sour ce of 
su pp ly. Such was Ja pan's commandL_ ~ role in America's 
econo mic rel at ions with the Far East~44 
''lhen the Sino-Japanese war erupted in 1937, the 
facts of t he 'l"ast Asian trade did not work to the ad vantage 
of the American commercial community in China .. Jn the 
f irst place , the eco nomic st ake of t.q.e Upited J t a:tes in the 
whole of Asia was small. In the years i m ed.L-3tely prior . to 
1937, exports fro m t he United States to both China and 
Japan amounted to little more than 10 per cent of tota l 
Ameri can export tra de, ttrhich in turn a ccounte d for con "'id-
erably less than 10 per cent of total American out 1ut. I.f 
commer cial relations i· it h eith er or both be lli g erents col-
la p sed --s a conse qu ence of the hostilities, it was clear 
th a t no acute problem of economic instability would be 
cre a ted for the United States . 45 In the second pl ace , 
Japan was more v luabl e to the co mmer ce of the United States 
th an l·rn.s China. In 1936, Ameri can sa les to Ja pan ·were in 
excess of 'i 204,G00,ooo, while 011ly 46,800,000 in American 
cmnmodities were marketed in China.46 In terms of specific 
43'raylor 11 oreign Poli ey Reports, XIII ( Fe bruary 
15, 19JS}~ 278. ' . 
44Masland, 'rhe P:acific Historical Review, XI 
September, 1911--2), 2b3-o4. . 
45willia m W. Lockwood, .Jr., 11Ameri can Neut-rality and 
the Far IlJas t," Far Eas tern Survey, VI {September 15, 1937}, 213. 
46Ibid. 
-
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items . China's consumpti on of refined oil products in 19,36 
was only one-fourth that amo1mt absorbed by Japa.n .47 After 
1935 , moreover , t he China tr ade in American cotton goods , 
the commodity thnt gave the United St ates its lar gest 
tra ding stake in East Asia, had virtu ally disappeared , 
whil e Japan had become the mar ket for one.fourt h of all the 
South's exported cotton .48 Generously approximated , Ch ina 
represented sli ghtly more than 1 per cent of the United 
States' foreign trade . t rom any angle , China's place in 
the Am-erican economy was smal1 . 49 
Thus the economic realities of Asian-American com-
mercial rel a tions failed to gi•1re added weigh t to the 
deroa.nds of the American businessman in China for a more 
forceful United States policy against Japan . -Not only v1as 
he robbed of the argument that his trade was an important 
link in America ts economi c chain , but he was also confron ... 
t ed with other commerci al gr oups which eonsidered ·trade ·with 
Ja pan of fa1" greater irnpor"tance to their own and to th e 
nation's welfare .. As mi ght be expe cted ,. these groups were 
anxious to maint ain and expand their econo mic rel ations 
with Japan , an d locked with disfavor upon any action 
------------ ·--------------------
4 ?Walter A~ Radius , ''The Play of Petroleum Forces 
in the Far East° Far Eastern Survex VII (September 7, 
193 ) , 208. ' . . - ~ 
46William w. Lockwood, Jr ., "North China and the 
United Sta t es Cotton Trade , rt Far _Eastern Survey, VII ( ay 
18; 1938) , 115. 
49uwhatts Our Stake in China?" , Business Week , 
August 7 , 1937 ., P• 15. 
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which m..ight i mpair t his trade .,50 Already faced with a body 
of opinion in th e United Stat es 1-!hich was hostile to the 
possibility of be coming involved in a foreign war "for a 
little trade and a few dolla rs, tr t he American busine ss 
community in China was confronted with a fina ncial balance 
sheet t ha t made one point inescapably clear: the China 
trade w· s of no vital importance to the United States. 
Aside from t he i nsi gni fi canc e of the China trade to 
the econo my of th e United States a:s a 1. hole , Americ an in-
vest ments in China were marked by sever al special features 
whic h served to diminis h the i mportance of Sino-American 
eeonomic relations still f urther. The bulk of American 
holding s i n China '&'ere the subsidiaries of lar g e cor po--
rations located in the United Sta tes. The reve nues which 
t hese companies derived from their busine ss in China · con..-
stituted only a small fraction of their total incom es . 
The petroleum industryt .for example, the industrial grou p 
with the largest stake in the Far East , ex ported no more 
than about 2 per cent of domestic produ ction in refi ned 
products to the .>1hole of East Asia. 51 Si mil arly, the 
Shan gha i Tele ph one Company _, mentioned else where as one of 
the most val uable American investments in China. supplied 
onl y abo ut 3.9 per cent of the total operating revenues of 
Int ern ati onal Telephone and Tel egraph , the paren t or gani~ 
zation. In brief , none of the l arger American companies 
with investme nts i,n China was in a position to suffe r more 
5 :tasl a.nd, The Pac ific Histori cal Revie\'l, XI 
(September, 1942~, 285. 
51Farley, Far Eastern Survei, V {July 29, 1936 ), 167. 
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than minor loss of inco me as a rasult of the Si no ... Japanese 
conflict. In addition , pro perty damage in almost every 
case was cover ed by insuranc e. ~lhi le dis tressed to see 
their China trade curt a iled, the i mmense size of these cor ... 
por aticn s allo wed them to absorb t his loss without any 
threat to their over -al l financial poeition.52 
The out break of var in China was al so the occasion 
for the American businessman to demonstrate the remarkable 
degree of resilience of which h eh s always been ca pab le. 
The petrolellil industry, gradu ally eliminated fro m the re-
fining and marketing phases of t he industry in Ja panese-
dominated areas of China , quickly recovered by shifting its 
emphasi s to t he field of crude oil which it sold in great 
.uanti ties to th e Japanese . At the same time, American oil 
r 
comnanies began to partici pat e more ext en sivel y in the ex-
ploitation, develo pment, and distribution of petroleum 
products in the -etherlands Indies, Br itis h Malaya, the 
Phi li ppines, and else wher e. 53 
The American to ba cco indu stry, too, dis pla yed this 
same reali tie aoproach to the unfavorabl e conditions whi ch 
war had brou "ht to one o.f its best markets . Forced out of 
China by the disru ptions whi ch all war s bring to commerce, 
the industry announced that the "tre mendo us Chinese market'r 
was ruined "for the duration of th e war,." The toba cco 
52"Little Threat to U. S . Investments in China,n 
The Fina,.ncial World, LXVIII (September 1, 1937) , 8. 
53Radiu s, Far Eas tern Surve :y; VII (Se ptemb er 7, 
1938 }, 206-11. 
exporters, however, g· ve notice th at they had turned to 
Central and South Americ a where th ey planned to r etriev e 
some of the losses suf f ered elsewhere.54 
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The impulse for peace which was so strong among the 
Americ an people durin g the mid-'thirties pcn~tr ated the 
thi nkin g of com.merci a.l circ l es a.e well. The edito r of a 
leading exp ort journal r€ marked that he wap i, const a ntly 
amazed to hear ex port exeeuti ves say t hat . they would rath~r 
see their trade st opp ed t han to risk war . tt55 "America n 
'isolationism,• u said the Commercial _ and · 1nancial 
Chronicle , 11is a poli cy whose wisdo m is enforced by th e ob-
vious f a cts of the world situation.rt56 On another oc-
casion, this same journal edit oria.lize.d that nno more now 
than in 1919 do the people of this country want to see th e 
United States mix ed up in any way with th e Lea ue or en-
tan gled at any point with the politics of Euro pe or Asi a, tt57 
These opi nions were to persist among the members of th e 
business community throu ghout the dec ade which prec eded 
Worl d War II. A survey conducte d as l ate as 1940 reveal ed 
th at three out of four busines s exe cutives in the United 
54,"Worl d Unrest 1 " · United States Tobaec o Journal, CXXIX (March 26, 193$), p •• 
55ftThe Editor Thin ks Out Loud , 11 ~mer ic an Ex-oorter, 
CXX (Febru ary , 1937), P~ 32 
56nconeernin u Americ an 1 Iso l ationis ·,, n, Cooone.x:ci al 
and Finan ci al Chrqn :lcle , CVL (Octo ber 16, 1937), p . 2451. 
57n It .Ching to Take a Hand," Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle, CXLVI (June 11, 1938), p. 3718. 
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States still favored either appeasement of the Japane se or 
letting nature take its course.58 
The apparent failure of the American busi nessman in 
China to win the sympathy and support of the cow.mercial 
groups within the United States undoubtedly contributed to 
his lack of success in influen cin g American poli cy toward 
Japan. 1'he motives which prompted financial int ere st s in 
China to demand firmer measure s aga in st the Japanese were 
not compatible with the attitudes genera lly held by the 
comn1erci al community at home . While i'ew American business ... 
men any ·1here sa nctioned Japan's milit aristi c policies, the 
urge to carry on "'business as usualn predisposed the major. 
ity to look with disfavor upon any sug gestion of strong 
action which might pr ovok e war between the United States 
and Japan . This view was held by the business community at 
large.59 
In the fi nal analysis , a combina tion of both 
econo mic nd olitic 1 factors pre-vented the American com-
mercial community in China from exertin g any apprec i abl e 
egree of influence over United States policy toward Ja pan. 
It was not because of success J. ul agitation by commercial 
groups with vested interests i n China that Americ an diplo-
macy came to the defense of the Open Door. American states-
men were not concerne d with the f a te of a trade relat,ion-
ship whi ch had never developed beyond the embryonic stage. 
(Se 
5gFortune, 
59Masland, 
tember, 1942 ), 
X.XI {September, 1940), P• 73. 
The Pacific Histori ca l Review, XI 
285, . 
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They were concerned, howev~r , with thwarting Japanes e im-
perialism which threatened the balance of power in the 
Pacific . If Japan should go unhindered in its head -lo ng 
rush for empire, the security of American possessions in 
the Fa:r East would ultimately be threatened~ It was to 
deter Ja pan that the United States supported the Open Door-, 
and not becaus~ of any intrinsi c regard for American com .. 
mercia l interests in China, 
-104 
CHAPTER V 
SUMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The history of American commercial relations with 
China is a long and complex one, dating from the earliest 
d~ys of the American Republie . The interest of the United 
States Government in the China trade reached its zen:i.th 
with the promulg ation of the Open Door Poli cy by Secretary 
of State John Hay in 1900. Jith Hay 's famous series of 
diplomatic notes, the conce pt of commercial equa.lit.y within 
Chi.na; became a "positive interest" of the Uni.ted Sta'tes.l 
Acco mpan:v.ing this declaration had eome the additiona l pro ... 
notmcement that res pect for China 's territorial and admin--
istrati ve integrity was also now an official part of 
American foreign poli cy. This marked the entrance of the 
United Stat~s into the political entanglements of East 
Asia,.2 
Such an abrupt departure from America's traditiona l 
concern tor only hemis1heric politi cs was not followed by 
any realirrtic . appraisal of 1.,1hat must be q_one if national 
power was to be brou ght into balan ce with this new in gr ed-
ient in national policy. In the ; .. e-ars which followed, the 
United States Government made, no effort to :provide for the 
adequate defense of the Open Door.3 The doctrine of the 
Open Door was., then, a virtual .dead letter from its in-
ception. 
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The American people evinced no greater enthusia sm 
for the Open Door in China than did their government. An 
area so far removed from the United States and seemingly so 
little related to domesti c security was incapable of 
arousing any su~tained intere st . 4 This same lack of enthus-
iasm was re f lected by the indifferent attitude which the 
majority of Americ an businessmen dis played toward periodi c 
efforts by government officials to interest them in direct 
investments in China,5 As a cons-equence, America's 
economic stake in China re mained insignificant down through 
the years., 
Ja pan 's conquest of' Manchuria in 1931-.19.32 and its 
even more alarming assault upon Chin a proper in 1937 
sharply challen ged the two fundamental princi ple s of the 
Open Poor. 'l'he question of engaging in war with the 
Japanese Empir e in order to safe guard Americ an commercial 
privilege s in China, or to preserve the territorial integ ... 
rity of the Chinese Republic, was n€ver seriou sly enter-
. tained by the United States Government. No administrati on 
had ever believed that the Open Door was worth a war , and 
this judgement had been sustained by American public 
3osgood, p. 79. 
5 uigley 1 p . 36, 
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opin ion.6 
In 1937, however , American st a:tesmen sens ed that 
so:methin.g more was imrol ved than the mere violation of a 
doctrine that had . never been cons.i de-red of intrineie value 
to either the political or economic wel l-bein g of the 
United Stat es. Japanese i mperia lism as on the mareh in 
Asia, If allowed to procee d unhindered, Japan might 
destroy the delicate balance of power in the Pacific., The 
Americ an Gover~ent came to realize th at its pol icy towar-d 
events in China must be integrated 1n th a foreign policy 
towax-d t he world as a whol e in the interest of prev enting 
world--wide aggres sion.? 
It had been with this lar ger objecti ve in mind that 
Secretary of Sta te Cordell Hul l wrote to Vice- resident 
Garner in 1937 that the interest of the United State •s in 
the Sino-Japanese conflict nrar trans-cends in i mportanae 
th@ value of' American ·trade with China or American invest• 
ments in China; it transcends even the • • • welfare of 
American citizens in China . tt8 A scuttling de parture from 
the Asian mainland in the face of da.nger cou ld only sig-
nify to the Japanese a complete retreat by the United 
.:>tates from the Pacifie~9 Such encouragement must not be 
6osgood~ lh 62. S.ee also Neu:-mann. p , 148,. and 
Gri s"rold, p • 469 . 
. 
7cnou I-kua, tt'fne American Pol.icy in China, 1929 ... 
19.39n (unpu bl ished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1949), p. J. 
8Hull, I, 567. 9Blum, I, 480. 
giv en to those who showed open disdain for "orderly pro ... 
cesses in international relationships.ulO 
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The decision had thus been reached that Japan's 
ambitions in East Asia must be thwarted. Conditions 
peculiar to the moment made the question of method partic ... 
ularly dif f icult._ American citizens with an econo mic stake 
in China noisily demanded th at the United States t ake 
strong measures to stop the Japanese... The disposition oJ: 
their .fellow countrymen half a world away , ho:i,,rever) was 
quite dif fe rent. The years af ter World War I had brought a 
deep sense of d isillusion ment to the American homeland.. 
Pr~sident Wilson's League of Nations had been rejected by 
his own people, and the partici pa tion of the United States 
i n the Great 1 ar itself had come to b e profoundly regretted. 
An intense revulsion against war had elicited fro m the 
cj_tiz en s of the United Sta tes a firm resolve never again t ·o 
bE!-come involved in the qu arre .ls of foreign po1.,.re:rs. ·The 
isolationist sentiment, never too far beneath the surf ace 
of the American mind, had been excited to new hei ghts in 
the ea rly and , j_d- 1 t hirt ies• 
This national deter min at ion to avoid f'o.re .ign wars 
imposed sev ere li mitations uuon those 1.iho were entrusted 
with conducting the f orei gn af fa irs of' the United States at 
the ti me of Ja pan's inv a sion of' China. Any action which 
might jeopardize the pea ce and tr anquillty of' the nation 
woul d not be tolerated by the American people. After much 
. . 
10Hull, r. 567. 
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l 
-se.a.rc-hing of min d s, United St.ates offieials had been forced 
to c0-nclude that the only visible means of restraining 
Japan seemed to rest in a vigorous defense of American 
ri ghts and interests in China. Yet .even this fe.eble gea-
ture was subje ·ct to stron g criticis m in 'the United States . 
I 
Throu ghout 1937 and 193$, there were continuous demt;n:ds to 
ree all all Am.ericans fro m China and to withdraw of f icial 
pr o·t;ecti on fro m those who chose to re mai n .• · The ti.oost:ivelt 
Admi nistration, howev er-, persistently r efu sed to surrender 
this one means at its t1is posal by which it hoped to 
restra1,.n Ja pan,,. 
The deci s ion to i nvoke the :principles of the Op-en 
Door h ad not resulted from any desire to su pport the 
material interests of A."nerican commercial groups in China. 
The motives c;i.f the goverri ment had been stric ·t ,ly poi:ttic a l 1 
not economic. There was nothing new in this use of 
Americ an business interests in China as an instrument of 
national pol icy. 'l1he occasion for the forma l announcem ent 
of. the Open Door in 1900 hatl been the impendin g dis ember• 
m~nt of Ghina., an eve :nt which Secretary of State Jol, n Hay 
had hoped to prev ent. . In .so far as Hay thou ght of economic 
considerations at all , he ha d tr ade in mind, but his main 
objective was to secure .a political result . 11 I n the years 
bet ween 1900 a.nd ·lorld War I, Se cr etarie-s Knox and Lansing 
had both sou ght to interest Americ an business men in various 
financial sehe mes in China for the political purpose of 
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counter balancin g Rus sian and Japanese influence in 
M nahuria and China.12 Thus i-then the United St ate s 
Government used the Open Door as a pol i tic a l weapon aga inst 
the Ja nane se i n 1937, it -~--ra.~ only fo llo wing a long historic-
p:reeedent. 
A study of United States poliey as it evolved 
during 1937 and 19.3$ cl early refutes the clai m that 
American commercial interests in Chin a exe rted any appre-
ci ab le influence upon foreign :relations .. To the contrary, 
it i s a paren t t hat the United States Government usec the 
pr esence of business interests wit hi n China f or the 
political pur pose of obs tr uc ting J apan's eff orts to cre ate 
a u eo-prosperi ty" $phe:1:~e in the .Far East! The Dep art ment 
of St a te, oreov er, fre quently to ok ste ps to discourage 
econo J.ic activ ities whic h i ght benef it Japanese imper-
iali.sm. en cert ain Japane se in dustrial interests at.temp-
ted to secure 1· 50;000,0 00 in credits fro m private Ameriean 
sources earl y in 1938 , Washin gto n quic kly let it be known 
th a t it di d not approve any such credits,, and t he matter 
was irrJin-ediately dro np ed.1.3 On another occasion, several 
Japanese sources b.j.nted t hat t here •w·ou ld be many opportun-
i tie$ for indirect Western i nves t ments in the subjugated 
areas of North China. Again th e United 0tate-s Govern ment 
indicated that it would look wit h di sfa vor up on th e 
. . 
l)"Sino ... Ja.panes -e War,. n · Q9mrnerc:b !S·l c nd Fina.nci ,~ 
Chronicle, CXLVIII (J anuary 22, 193~),483. 
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provision of American cap ital for purposes of exploit in g a 
conquer ed territory.14 The Stat e Departmen t was als o suc-
cessful in halt i ng the shipment of-American aircraft and 
aerial bombs to Japan . In Ju ly, 1938 , Secretary of St ate 
Hull re minded all Ameri can manufacturers of aeronautical 
equipment t hat tho United Sta tes Government was stro ngly 
opposed to the sale of airplane s and equipment to nations 
whi ch bombed civilian popu lations~ Although Japan was not 
mentione d by name, Washin gton noted with satisfa ction that 
by November, 193$, appli cations for export licenses of air-
craft and aerial bombs to Japan had disappeared .15 
Commercial groups in the Uni t ed State s often complained 
against such li mitations upon their activities , but they 
nevertheless were willing to accept the jud gement of their 
' 
government without any serious ~esistence .1 6 
While Unit ed States policy toward Ja pan was never 
tailored to fit the desires of American business interests 
in China. , there is a sense i n i·?hich these commercial groups 
did influence the su bsequen t course of Japanese- American 
relations . As t he war in China dragged on, resentment 
;::,._ __ against Japan mounted in the United St ates . Japanese air-
cr aft continued to bomb cro wded Chin ese cities, killing 
thousa .nd s. The war whic h Ja pan had begu..'1 demolished 
ll1-stewar t, Far Eas tern Survey, VII ( Octob er 12-, 
1938) t 235 . 
15nsino-Ja panese War," Commerci al , nd Financial 
Chronicle, CXLVIII { Jan uary 14, 1939) ~ 164-65, · 
16Masland, The Pacific His torical Review, XI (September, 1942) , 289. · 
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American churc hes and schools, ruined American businesses, 
and destroyed Ameri can lives • .' . he brutality and dis re gard 
for Ameri can interests whi ch the Japan-as .... exhibited 
gradl;le .lly angered the people of the Unit .ed States.l7 
Growing popular- indi gnation made poss i ble an 
increasingly strong stand against Japan. By the end of 
1938, the United State s was no longer concerned with 
seru pul ously maintaining the outward appe arance of 
neut:t·ality . On Dece mber 15, the Unit ed ·St ates- Export .... Import 
Bank plaeed $25 , 000,000 in credits at the disposal of 
Nationalist China . This enabled China to make vit al pur~ 
chase ,s of essential war mater i als ., ln addi tio n , the 
Arneriean treasury extended the Chinese-Americ.:-.m mone tary 
agreement or July 9, 1937, by- whieh China was able ·to 
obtain dollar exchan ge aga inst its gold reserves in New 
York. ·These were the firs t positive aids to the National ist 
Government since the Japanese :i.nvasion~1$ 
. 'rh is mate ri a l assistance to China was fol lo wed tn 
the summer of the followin g year by the a ouncement that 
the Unit ed States was abr ogating its 1911 comJnercial treaty 
with Japan . Formal noti ce th at the treaty would be ter-
minated in six month's ti me was given to the Japan-ese 011 
July 26 , 1939. I1:1 t he j .udgement of t he State D·epartme:nt~ 
Tokyo's hostility to American i ntere sts in China did not 
17Feis , • ·18. 
l 8nu., • Counters Japants New Order in Asia , " 
J:oreign Polic y.Bul l etin, XVII! (De~ember 30, 1938}, 1. 
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merit the continuance of a s pe cial co.r..mercial arrangement 
between the United States and Jupan,19 This was a step 
that President Roosevelt and Secr etary Hull had been con-
te mpla tin g for some ti me.20 It was a measure that woul d 
have · been out of the question t wo years before, but which 
now be came possible in l arge part be cause of the changin g 
cli mate in American public opinio n . 
Thus, while th e i ni tial pr ot -ests of American bus-
iness men in China did not influence the formation of the 
United St ates' res ponse to Ja pan's challen ge, the repeated 
destru ction of American interests in China by a callous 
aggressor did su ccee d in wor king a chang e upon the mind of 
the American publie. And as the attitud€ of Amet'icans 
toward ~lapan stiffened , the gov ern men t in Wash i ng,-eon was 
gi ven increased latitude in its effort ·s to det er Japanese 
:imperialis m in East Asia. Interf erence with American 
ri ghts in Chi na by the Japanese did , t hen , have an ultimate 
effect upon Americ an poli cy,, not as a pri me mover, but as 
one among a growi ng number o.f grievance$ whi ch the United 
States came to harbor aga inst Japan., 
l9Hull, I, 636-J7. 
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